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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 1981 more than 12,000 members of the Professional Air Traffic 
Controller's Organization (PATCO) went on strike. They hoped to bring air traffic in 
the United States to a virtual standstill and thereby force the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to accede to militant union demands highlighted by a $10,000  
pay increase. The government responded quickly, certain that the public would 
back them rather than allow federal employees, already considered well-paid, to 
receive raises of such magnitude. First, the FAA used computer technology to 
institute a flow-control system for air traffic which enabled skeleton crews of non­
striking air traffic controllers, with the assistance of supervisors and hastily 
reassigned military personnel, to maintain air traffic at seventy-five per cent of 
normal operating levels; and second, they fired all striking PATCO members who  
refused to return to work within forty-eight hours for their participation in an 
illegal strike. In addition, government officials successfully wooed media support 
to their side by taking a strong stand against wage increases for 'overpaid' illegal
strikers; and by their repeated reassurances that air traffic would neither suffer in
volume nor in safety due to the strike. On August 5, President Reagan, 
Department of Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis, and FAA Administrator J. Lynn 
Helms, became the big winners and nearly 12,000 union members joined the ranks 
of the unemployed.
My paper focuses on the government's claim that sufficient technology  
existed to replace fired air traffic controllers without negatively affecting the 
volume or safety of air traffic. It addresses only the internal issues of how the 
FAA dealt with their technology, their employees, and the strike. It does not 
attempt to deal with the broader scope of issues in the external environment in
which the strike took place, such as the role of the private sector.
1
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Put simply, air traffic control is a system for providing safe air travel by 
monitoring airplanes from take off to landing to make certain that planes do not fly 
in unsafe weather conditions, nor fly in too close proximity with other planes. In 
good visibility, pilots are able to assist with this task, but in bad weather the air 
traffic control system is entirely responsible for directing pilots who must fly blind. 
The air traffic control system can be divided into two components —  the 
technological component and the human component. The technological 
component consists of computers which process pre-flight data about the type of 
airplane and the flight plan, as well as data about actual plane movement as 
monitored by radar, to generate information concerning the plane's location, speed, 
and projected trajectory on a display screen monitored by an air traffic controller. 
The air traffic controller (the human component) monitors the screen and radios 
necessary changes in flight pattern to the pilot. The air traffic controller must 
determine the correct changes in flight patterns necessary to maintain a safe 
course for each airplane in his/her area. The controller must also interact with 
other controllers as s/he 'passes' an airplane from his/her own area to the area of 
another controller.^ The strike left only 5,700 out of more than 17,000^ air traffic 
controllers on the job. To maintain air traffic immediately following the strike, the 
FAA relied on a strike contingency plan which included assigning supervisors to air 
traffic control duty, bringing in military air traffic controllers temporarily, and using 
a computerized flow control system. While successfully used to break the strike, 
the contingency plan proved unsatisfactory as a long-term  solution to providing air 
traffic control. Military air traffic controllers had to be reassigned to their regular 
duties. Supervisors needed to return to their other duties. The flow-control
^H oo-m in  0. Toong and A m ar Gupta, "Autom ating A ir T ra ffic  Control," Technoiogy R eview  85 (April 
1982) 4 3 -4 4 .
S., D epartm ent of T ransportation , Federal A viation  A dm in istration , O ffice o f A viation  M edicine, 
"Adjustm ents in the  A ir T ra ffic  S ervice Follow ing the  PATCO Strike," by E.W. Pickrel, in S election  o f Air 
T ra ffic  C ontro llers , ed. S,B. Sells, John T  Daily, and Evan W , Pickrel, W ashington, D C., 1984, p. 119.
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system, which evened out air traffic throughout the day, did not satisfy the 
commercial airlines, which wanted to schedule commercial flights to coincide with  
peak morning and evening demand.
Within a month after the strike, the FAA began actively recruiting individuals 
to train as air traffic controllers. Prior to the strike, individuals who wanted to 
become air traffic controllers received specialized training and then worked in the 
field for five or more years before attaining Full Professional Level (FPL). FPL 
status meant that a controller had qualified to work any position in a facility.^ 
Even with full replacement in numbers of air traffic controllers during the post­
strike period, it would not be possible to replace the level of expertise in 
manpower which existed during the pre-strike period in less than five years.
The question, then, is did the FAA have or has it put into place the 
necessary technology to provide adequate air traffic control in the United States 
following the firing of nearly 12,000 air traffic controllers because of their 
participation in the PATCO strike. This question can best be answered by 
comparing pre-strike conditions to post-strike conditions. The immediate post-  
strike period proved to be exceptional —  both because of the implementation of 
the strike contingency plan and because the working air traffic controllers and their 
supervisors displayed a high degree of esprit de corps.'* Therefore, I will define 
three separate time periods for my comparison. These periods are the pre-strike  
period; three years prior to the strike (m id-1978 to mid-1981); the immediate post­
strike period: seven months after the strike (August 1981 to March 1982); and the
^U.S., D epartm ent of Transportation , Federal A viation A dm inistration. O ffice of A viation M edicine, 
Selection  o f Air T ra ffic  C ontro llers, ed. S B. Sells, John T. Daily, and Evan W. Pickrel, W ash ington, D.C.,
p. 14.
^U.S., D epartm ent of Transportation , Federal A viation A dm in istration , "M anagem ent and Em ployee  
Relationships W ith in  the  Federal A viation A dm in istration ," prepared by Law rence M. Jones, David  
G. Bow ers, and S tephen H. Fuller in A ir T ra ffic  Control R evita lization  Act o f 1981. H earings before  the  
C om m ittee  on Post O ffice  and C ivil S erv ice , 97th  Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1 9 8 1 -1982 , pp. 1 1 -1 2 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
post-strike period: three years after the immediate post-strike period (early 1982 
to early 1985). Several indicators will be compared to determine whether or not 
the FAA had, or has put into place, the necessary technology to replace the fired 
air traffic controllers.
The first indicator is the technology of air traffic control itself. I will 
compare the technology in use during the pre-strike period to the technology in 
use during the post-strike period. The FAA referred to the technology of the ATC 
system as the National Airspace System (NAS). When first put into place in the 
1960s, experts in the field considered NAS to be the cutting edge of 'mainframe' 
computer technology.^ Despite considerable improvements in the efficiency of 
NAS since the 1960s, by the early 1980s experts called it 'dangerously obsolete."® 
In order to make up for the loss of fully qualified air traffic controllers after the 
strike, the FAA would need to have put new technology into ATC facilities. A 
failure to upgrade the technology would be one indication that the government did 
not have sufficient technology to replace the fired air traffic controllers.
The second indicator is the volume and safety of air traffic during the pre­
strike and post-strike periods. Safety can be measured not only by the number of 
accidents which occurred during the pre- and post-strike periods which can be 
attributed to a failure in the air traffic control system, but also by the number of 
near misses recorded; i.e., incidents in which two or more planes came 
dangerously close to each other. If the FAA had, or put into place, the necessary 
technology to replace the fired air traffic controllers, I would expect to find the 
post-strike volume of air traffic to be the same or greater than the pre-strike  
volume, with an accompanying safety record during the post-strike period which is 
the same or better than during the pre-strike period.
® H oo-m in , "Autom ating A ir T raffic ," p. 43
®lbid., p. 40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The third indicator is working conditions for air traffic controllers during the 
pre - and post-strike periods. The FAA highlighted the demand for increased pay 
when explaining the cause of the strike. However, prior to the strike, working 
conditions also dissatisfied most working controllers. If the government had, or 
put into place, the necessary technology to offset the loss of nearly 12,000 air 
traffic controllers, then it would be reasonable to expect that working conditions 
have improved since the strike. Evidence that the government had sufficient 
technology would include a rise in overall job satisfaction, a decline in the amount 
of overtime required of workers, and a decline in the level of stress associated 
with the job.
To summarize, if the government's claim to having sufficient technology to 
replace the fired air traffic controllers can be upheld, I would expect to find more 
and better technology available to working air traffic controllers, the same or 
improved levels of air traffic volume and safety, and improved working conditions 
among air traffic controllers as evidenced by overall job satisfaction, hours of 
overtime, and levels of stress. If I find negative changes in one or more of the 
indicators, then I would conclude that there is reason to doubt the government's  
claim, and that this doubt must be considered in any discussion of the cost of the 
government's decision to fire the air traffic controllers who struck in 1981.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter II
THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM —  PRE-AUGUST, 1981
The air traffic control {ATC) System in the United States is a federally 
operated system which provides navigation and landing aid, flight planning and 
separation to aircraft using the nation's airspace. Since 1958, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), currently within the Department of Transportation (DOT), has 
administered the ATC system. The key air traffic control function which will be 
discussed in this paper is separation of aircraft. The ATC system, although it has 
evolved considerably since its beginnings in the 1930s, is a ground-based system 
heavily dependent on a human component —  the air traffic controllers —  who 
must interact with the technology developed to track the movement of aircraft and 
the pilots responsible for flying individual aircraft. Separation is provided to all 
aircraft flying under instrument flight rules (IFR) which, by the late 1970s, included 
all aircraft flying in poor visibility as well as all flights requesting to fly IFR even in 
good visibility. For example, air carriers, aircraft which carry passengers for hire, 
routinely fly IFR under all weather conditions. There is no legal requirement for an 
air traffic controller to provide separation services to an aircraft flying under visual 
flight rules (VFR), nor are air traffic controllers required to provide separation 
between IFR and VFR aircraft. Controllers need only provide separation between 
IFR aircraft and other IFR aircraft.^
^U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation, Safety of the Traffic
C ontrol System s. Hearings before the subcom m ittee on Investigations and Oversight of t ^  C om m ittee  
on Public W orks and T ransportation , 98th  Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1983 -1984 , p. 173.
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The Technology of Air Traffic Control
Civilian air traffic control began in the United States in the m id-1930s with 
the establishment of air traffic control centers in Newark, Cleveland, and Chicago 
by private airlines.® In 1936, the U.S. Government took over these centers and
began expanding the system under the auspices of the Bureau of Air Commerce.®
Until after World War II, the technology of ATC consisted of radio communications 
between pilots and controllers. The pilots radioed in their time of arrival and 
altitude at established check points along their route. The controllers wrote down 
this information on pieces of paper called flight strips and directed pilots as
necessary to maintain sufficient separation between aircraft to avoid collisions.
This first generation of ATC came to an end with the widespread use of 
radar to track aircraft flight progress. First introduced to civilian ATC in the 
mid-1950s, primary surveillance radar (PSR) monitored flight progress both in the 
vicinity of airports and on en route airways. PSR relied on ground-based
equipment which provided data on horizontal flight progress of all aircraft within 
the range of the radar. PSR could not identify individual flights or provide vertical 
data, i.e., altitude. In order to obtain this information, the controller still had to 
contact each pilot by radio.
®U-S., Congress, O ffice o f Technology Assessm ent, A irport and Air T ra ffic Control System , 97th  
Cong., 2nd sess., 1982. p. 33
®U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on W ays and M eans, Review of M idair Aviation Safety. Hearing  
before  th e  subcom m ittee  of the C om m ittee  on W ays and M eans, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 88.
10O ffice  o f Technology Assessm ent, A irport, pp. 3 4 -3 5 .
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The FAA first used computers in the ATC system in 1959. Throughout the 
1960s, computers prepared flight strips and assisted with other bookkeeping 
tasks.
The 1960s also saw the development of the third generation of air traffic 
control. This technology first became operational in the early 1970s and was the 
state of the art at the time of the PATCO strike. The radar component of this 
generation, secondary surveillance radar (SSR), interacts with a transponder located 
on board the aircraft which sends out a signal that can be picked up by the radar. 
This signal identifies the aircraft and gives its altitude. Other components of the 
third generation include digitized information systems, computer-driven traffic 
displays, and automated flight plan processing and dissemination.’  ̂ The computer 
could now take In data from the radar and then display, on a controller's scope, 
detailed flight data including aircraft identification and altitude in alphanumeric 
form. The computer also could print out flight plans for each flight which could be 
updated by the controller and which the computer could pass from controller to 
controller as a plane flew from one controller's purview to another's. This 
eliminated a considerable amount of radio communication between controller and 
pilot for the exchange of routine flight information as well as telephone contact 
between controllers as they passed' a flight from one area to another.’ ^
One way to understand how the technology of air traffic control works is to 
follow an IFR flight from take off to landing en route from one major airport to 
another, such as from O'Hare to LaGuardia. Before leaving the gate at O'Hare, the
’ ’ c o m m itte e  on W ays and M eans, R eview , p. 89.
’ ^O ffice  of Technology Assessm ent, A irport, p. 35.
’ ^U.S., D epartm en t o f T ransportation , Federal A viation A dm inistration, "Autom ating the Crow ded  
Sky," by Raym ond G. Belanger, W ashington, D.C., from  A irforce Association, July 1975, p. 2. 
[M im eographed .]
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pilot contacts the tower controller to confirm the flight plan which the controller 
has previously received from the computer. Upon receiving clearance from the 
tow er controller, the pilot contacts ground control for taxiing instructions. Ground 
controllers working in the tower rely on both their visual scanning of the runways 
and airport surface detection equipment (ASDE) or ground radar to keep flights 
separated during taxiing. When ready for takeoff, the pilot recontacts the tower  
controller who also relies on both visual scanning of the airport and airport 
surveillance radar (ASR) to clear the aircraft for takeoff. One mile into flight the 
tower controller transfers responsibility for the flight to a departure controller also 
working out of O'Hare airport who directs the pilot to his/her proper course. The 
departure controller transfers the flight again, at approximately 30 miles out, to the 
en route center responsible for the Chicago area. Within the en route center, 
controllers are assigned sectors based both on vertical and horizontal location. As 
the flight moves both up and east, controllers within the Chicago en route center 
will transfer responsibility for the flight from one to another. As the flight reaches 
the edge of the Chicago en route center's area of responsibility, it is transfered to 
the Cleveland en route center and from the Cleveland en route center to the New 
York en route center. Within each en route center, several controllers may be 
responsible for the flight at different times as it moves east and changes altitude. 
The aircraft, now in descent, is passed to the New York approach-control facility 
where a controller directs it to its final approach to La Guardia airport. The flight 
is passed to the tower controller at LaGuardia at about six miles out who monitors 
the flight's instrument landing. Finally, ground control takes responsibility for the 
flight as it taxis to the gate.^'^
There are three major ATC facilities —  flight service stations (FSSs), 
terminal control facilities, and en route centers (ARTCCs). FSSs primarily service 
VFR flights by assisting with flight planning, providing weather information, and
^^O ffice of Technology Assessm ent, A irport, p. 39.
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aiding pilots with in-flight emergencies. They also provide flight plans for general 
aviation flights, whether they fly IFR or VFR, to ARTCCs and airport towers, and 
they assist VFR pilots in transferring to IFR when they hit unexpected bad weather 
mid-flight.^^ FSSs are only marginally involved in the primary ATC function —  
separation of aircraft.
There are twenty air route traffic control centers (ARTCCs) in the 
continental United States. These centers service IFR flights by monitoring their 
progress through en route airspace. The technological heart of each center is the 
IBM 9020, a computer derived from the IBM 360 expressly for ATC applications. 
The computer transforms radar data from the secondary surveillance radar, which 
provides raw data on horizontal flight location for all flights as well as altitude and 
flight identity information for aircraft equipped with transponders, into readouts on 
a controller's scope. This process is known as radar data processing (RDP), or 
narrow-band to the working controllers. The computer also automates the 
process of creating flight data strips. This not only cuts down on clerical work 
and communication of routine data for controllers, but, because the computer can 
communicate directly with other computers and other facilities, flight data can be 
passed from controller to controller in advance of the actual passing of 
responsibility for a flight. Each controller along a flight's path can anticipate and 
plan for the arrival of the flight into his/her sector with complete data on location, 
identity, speed, direction and altitude on the screen. The computer also alerts the 
controller to an impending handoff by causing the data s/he sees on the screen 
associated with a flight to blink as the flight approaches the edge of a sector and 
remain blinking until the controller in the new sector pushes a button that tells the 
computer the handoff is complete.^®
 ̂^O ffice  o f Technology Assessm ent, A irport, p. 33.
 ̂^Federal A viation A dm in istration , "Autom ating the C row ded Sky," pp. 2 -3 .
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Terminal control facilities provide service to flights during take off and 
landing. They also monitor IFR flights as they pass over, enter, or leave a terminal 
control area. They are not as uniform in the technology they provide as are 
ARTCCs. The basic component of a terminal control facility is a tower. In 1980, 
out of nearly 6,000 public use airports with paved runways, only 435 had control 
towers. However, it should also be noted that only 460 airports in the U.S. 
received air carrier traffic in 1980,^^ Major airports, in addition to having a tower, 
have a terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facility which controls 
sequencing and spacing of approaching aircraft and guides departing aircraft along 
departure corridors within approximately forty miles of the airport (or airports 
when more than one major airport is in a small area). Of the 435 airports with 
towers in 1980, 234 also had TRACONs.^® While visual scanning is an important 
activity in towers, towers as well as TRAÇONS also rely on airport surveillance 
radar to monitor aircraft.
The computer system available to terminals is the ARTS or automated radar 
terminal system. By 1980, the FAA had sixty-two ARTS Ills in place providing 
computer capability similar to that available at ARTCCs. At the same time, the FAA 
began installing ARTS Ils in terminals with less traffic density. FAA plans called for 
eighty terminals to receive the ARTS 11.̂ ® These systems provide somewhat less 
detailed data to the controllers, but have the capability of being expanded to ARTS 
ill capability if traffic demand warranted such an enhancement.
Landing aids are another important technological component of airport 
safety, although they are only tangentially related to air traffic control. Improved
^^O ffice of Technology Assessm ent, A irport, p. 10.
^®lbid., pp. 3 7 -3 8 .
^^C om m ittee  on W ays and M eans, R eview , p. 83.
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landing systems certainly take pressure off the ATC system if they increase the 
speed and safety with which aircraft can get out of the sky and onto the ground. 
Instrument landing systems (ILSs) were the best available landing aid at the time 
of the PATCO strike. An ILS has two components: a localizer which emits a radio 
beam along the center line of a runway and a glide slope which emits a radio 
beam along a fixed approach angle. Together these beams form an approach path 
along which the pilot aligns his/her plane for landing. Using ILS, a landing cannot 
be completed entirely under instrument operations because the equipment is not 
that accurate. At two hundred feet (one hundred feet for some runways) the pilot 
has to switch to visual operations to bring the plane down.^° To aid with this 
transition to visual operations, visual approach slope indicators (VASIs) may also 
be available to provide vertical guidance during the last phase of approach.^’ 
Although 2,198 airports had instrumented approaches in 1980, this figure includes 
non-precision landing aids as well as ILS, VAS I, and combinations thereof.^^
Although separation from other aircraft is the main ATC function, separation 
from bad weather is a related and important function. All three ATC facilities —  
FSSs, ARTCCs, and air terminal facilities —  serve as sources of weather  
information to pilots. Airlines are also required to provide their pilots with weather 
data. Controllers reroute aircraft to avoid bad weather conditions on their flight 
path. The main weather collection and dissemination component of the ATC 
system is the center weather service unit (CWSU) located at each ARTCC. Here, 
National Weather Service (NWS) meteorologists collect current weather data 
provided via the NWS air-weather communications system, weather radar (RRDWS),
^^O ffice of Technology Assessm ent, A irport, p. 30.
U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation , FAA Facility and Equipm ent 
Program s for S afety . H earings before the subcom m ittee  on A viation of the C om m ittee on Public W orks  
and T ran spo rta tio n , 95th  Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, p. 3
^^O ffice o f Technology Assessm ent, A irport, p.10.
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and pilot reports that come via controllers. The meteorologists then disseminate 
the information to FSSs, terminals, and the ARTCC controllers in their region. 
Dissemination is done by telephone to facilities outside the ARTCC, but usually 
within the ARTCC a supervisory controller (or weather service co-ordinator) is 
briefed daily and updated on specific weather hazards. S/he, in turn, updates 
controllers working affected sectors either verbally or by posting advisories "in the 
appropriate control sectors." Each controller also has a secondary radar scope 
channel available to him/her which depicts severe storm activity as "H's" on the 
screen. This radar scope is not as complete an indicator of weather activity as the 
radar remote weather display system (RRWDS) available to meteorologists working 
in the CWSU.^^
The three year pre-strike period saw a gathering storm of protest about the 
quality of ATC technology and the ability of the FAA to plan and develop an ATC 
system capable of meeting the demands of the 1980s and beyond. Congress 
heard testimony criticizing not only the technology currently in use in the ATC 
system, but also criticizing the FAA for not developing technology much needed in 
the system. This latter can best be exemplified by looking at the development of 
collision avoidance systems (CAS).
Although the ATC system's primary function is to separate aircraft using the 
technology described, making use of the ATC system by flying under IFR does not 
relieve the pilot of his/her responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft when 
visual conditions allow it. According to federal aviation regulations (FAR), "the 
pilot in command is directly responsible for . . . the operation of the aircraft (FAR 
91.3); when weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be
^^U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation , The Im pact of W e a th e r on 
A viation  Safety. Report o f the subcom m ittee  on Investigations and O versight of the C om m ittee  on 
Public W orks and Transporta tion , H. Rept., 98th  Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p. 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other 
aircraft . . . (FAR 91.67A)."^'^
For this reason, pilots and safety experts have long demanded that the FAA 
develop a collision avoidance system that would provide an independent alert of 
potential threats, as well as information on how to take evasive action. The 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent federal agency 
responsible for investigating transportation accidents and making recommendations 
for safety improvements, began recommending the development of a CAS to the 
FAA in 1969. The Board stated then that see-and-avoid was an outmoded concept 
and continued to assert this position throughout the 1970s.
The FAA tested and rejected several CASs during the 1970s. They rejected 
a system in 1973 that the Army had used successfully. In 1975, they rejected 
three more which manufacturers had submitted under contract. Finally, they  
announced that they would issue national standards for a ground-based system 
called beacon collision avoidance system (BCAS) by July 1977. They then refined 
BOAS further as active BCAS and full BCAS. The former, scheduled to be 
operational by the early 1980s, would not work in dense traffic areas (i.e., terminal 
areas) because it would emit too many false alarms. Furthermore, it would not 
show the pilot the location of threatening aircraft, thus mandating a change in 
attitude, as opposed to a change in direction, as the only response available to the 
pilot. Full BCAS would address these deficiencies in coordination with other yet to 
be developed technologies —  the discrete address beacon system and the 
automatic traffic advisory and resolution system (DABS/ATARS). However, these 
systems, at best, would be operational only sometime late in the 1980s.
^'^Quoted In Frank D. Fow ler, "Air T raffic  Control Problems: A Pilot's V iew ," H um an Factors 22 
[O ctober 19801 : 652.
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Meanwhile, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALFA) regularly testified before 
Congress in favor of another system —  trimodal BCAS. They believed that this 
system would provide the same benefits as full BCAS. However, since trimodal 
BCAS is an airborne system, the pilots believed it could be operational sooner than 
full BCAS because there would be no need for extensive development of other 
technologies to make it work. At a hearing held jointly before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation of the U.S. House of Representatives, Raymond 
Gerber, U.S. Director of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association, 
listed ALPA's requirements for an effective CAS and then testified that the FAA had 
failed to develop an effective collision avoidance system for three reasons;
One. The FAA's research and development in collision avoidance 
continues to receive a low priority. . . . Two. The FAA frequently holds out 
for the prospect of the perfect solution to all technical problems. Such a 
Utopian solution is always promised to be just over the horizon, . . . 
Three. The FAA's long established self-interest in promoting an entirely 
ground-based collision avoidance system causes it to proceed slowly in 
developing airborne systems. Also, the not-invented-here syndrome often 
leads to a rejection of ideas that were developed independently of FAA 
sponsorship.^^
In the summer of 1981, just prior to the PATCO strike, the FAA made a 
surprise announcement. They had cancelled development work on the ground- 
based collision avoidance system, BCAS. In its place, they had chosen an air-  
based system called threat alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) which they
^^U.S., Congress, Jo int C om m ittee  on C om m erce, Science, and Transportation  and C om m ittee  on 
Public W orks and Transportation , A viation Safety. Jo int H earing before the C om m ittee  on C om m erce, 
Science, and Transportation , U nited States Senate and the C om m ittee  on Public W orks and  
Transporta tion , House of R epresentatives, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, pp. 104 -1 0 5 .
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expected to be available in two to three years.^® This system would Interact with 
the transponders already available on most aircraft and would come in two forms 
—  TCAS I, for air carriers, which would provide the pilot with detailed information 
on the location of threatening aircraft, and TCAS II, for general aviation, which 
would merely give warning of a threatening a i r c r a f t . A L P A ' s  representative, 
testifying before Congress in 1981, noted that TCAS met all of ALPA's requirements 
for an effective CAS that Jack Gerber had listed in his 1978 testimony.^^ However, 
as Representative Barry Goldwater, Jr. pointed out at the first congressional 
hearings on TCAS, "after 12 years . . . there is still no operational CAS, except 
EYE-CAS. And that is spelled E -Y -E  . . . I'm afraid that when TCAS is ready in 3 to 
4 years, a new FAA administrator will say. Hey, there's something better just down 
the road,' and dump TCAS for the new system.
During this same time period, several Congressional committees held 
hearings to discuss problems with the en route computer system. The IBM 9020s 
located in ARTCCs used technology developed in the early 1960s, yet the FAA had 
no intention of beginning replacement of these computers until the late 1980s. 
The FAA had designed the 9020s using components of IBM 360s. However, IBM 
had stopped manufacturing 360s, and they had announced that by 1981, they 
would no longer make replacement p a r t s . T h e  FAA had had to order ten years 
worth of replacement parts in the late 1970s. The committee hearings brought out
^®U.S„ Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Science and Technology, A ircraft Collision A voidance and Air 
T ra ffic  S a fe ty. H earing before the subcom m ittee  on T ran spo rta tio n. Aviation, and M ateria ls  of the 
C om m ittee on Science and Techno logy, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 5.
^^Ibid., p. 24.
^^Ibid., p. 34,
^^Ibid., p. 5.
30 C om m ittee  on W ays and M eans, R ev iew , p. 6.
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evidence that In many ARTCCs the 9020s had nearly reached capacity, that 
computer outages occurred almost routinely, and that the FAA had failed to 
address these problems in a manner which would assure that the problems would 
be resolved in the near future.
The s ta te -o f- th e -a r t  third generation ATC system depended on the 9020s 
to function. When the computers went down for a minute or several hours, 
working air traffic controllers had to switch to the non-computerized radar 
technology of the second generation. This is called switching from narrowband to 
broadband. In 1979, at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, Howard
Johannssen, President of the Professional Airways Systems Specialists, whose 
members are responsible for the maintenance and certification of NAS systems 
and equipment, described such an event as follows:
The effect of a computer outage in an ARTCC is chilling. The
narrowband digital display scopes, presenting the identification, location, 
altitude and speed of hundreds of airplanes, go blank or freeze, the first
minute of an outage is crucial to both the controller and to the ten to
twenty airplanes he/she is working. He/She must attempt to reconstruct 
the three dimensional picture he/she had and convert the information to 
the almost twenty year old broad non-computerized displays which serve 
as the back-up radar system. It is more that [sic] disconcerting that the 
FAA has provided no standardized system for alerting controllers of the 
outage, its severity, or the reliability of the data depicted on their scopes.
Even after the controller lowers the heavy broadband scope into place, 
if it doesn't get stuck, the problem isn't solved. The broad band system 
is about as reliable a back-up system to narrow band as two tin cans are 
to a telephone. Its non-computerized, fuzzy television-type display was 
never designed to serve the complex and crowded aviation today. It 
depicts no aircraft information nor can a controller easily locate or 
distinguish aircraft which are in heavy weather on the scope. Even more 
importantly, fewer and fewer controllers have any depth of experience 
with the system and there is less and less emphasis on training for 
broadband. . . .
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If the narrowband system stays 'down' for any period of time, the 
danger remains that the broadband system can also fail, which [recently] 
happened in New York. With the narrowband down, one of the three 
radar systems feeding into the ARTCC went out for 40 minutes. For 40 
minutes, one third of New York Center had no satisfactory radar coverage 
of any kind.^^
The FAA stated that transitioning from broadband to narrowband did not 
jeopardize safety. Neither, they argued, did the use of broadband by itself 
jeopardize safety. According to then Deputy Administrator, Quentin Taylor, "the 
basic impact from using broadband radar rather than RDP [narrowband], or manual 
control rather than broadband, is a loss of efficiency in the s y s t e m . T h e  FAA 
also stated that computer interruptions did not create a serious problem —  most 
lasted less than one minute and occurred as part of the computer's self- 
maintaining capabilities. However, a House subcommittee report issued in August 
1981 concluded that "the Agency's outage reporting system only covers wholly 
anticipated, sudden, total, and enduring failures. This does not accurately portray 
the safety-related problems faced by controllers."^^ At about the same time, the 
Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report which concluded "that the 
computer workload capacity at each center is unknown; that to keep the software 
operating, machine-language patching is standard procedure; and that eight of the 
20 centers expect computer saturation between 1982 and 1985. Also, it is not 
uncommon for the centers to drop all non-essential operations and to go to the 
backup computer to support air traffic control operations during busy periods."^'*
p. 47.
^ ^ U .S , Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Science and Technology, Air Traffic  Control En Route 
C om pu ter M odern ization. Report prepared by the subcom m ittee  on Transportation , A viation, and 
M ateria ls  of the  C om m ittee  on Science and Technology, H. Rept., 97th  C o n g , 1st sess., 1981, p. 4.
^'’ ibid., p. 10.
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By the time of the strike, FAA critics agreed that the en route computer 
system needed to be replaced and the primary roadblock to such a major 
undertaking could be found in the FAA's own organization.
The FAA . . . [does] not fully recognize the . . . complexity [of full 
replacement] and [has] not programmed funds to assure its timely 
completion. The FAA has not established . . . sufficient authority to carry 
out both the development and procurement. . . . The acquisition 
schedules and plans . . . appear to lack top level Administration 
commitment and are therefore subject to frequent changes in response to 
a variety of expediencies unrelated to the critical need for enhanced air 
safety.^^
The third area of conflict between the FAA and its critics concerned FAA 
policy over the spending of money, or, to be precise, the non-expenditure of 
available funds. In 1970, Congress passed the airport development aid program 
(ADAP), which set up a trust fund to be used primarily for facilities and equipment 
as well as research and development expenditures. The FAA collected a variety of 
user fees, such as an eight per cent tax on airline tickets, a seven cent per gallon 
tax on jet fuel, and a five per cent tax on the weight bill for freight traffic, to 
support the trust fund. By 1979, the trust fund balance surpassed three billion 
dollars.^® During the 1970s, the FAA had used these funds for everything from 
installing the en route computer system and the ARTS computers to providing ILS 
and VASI to airports. On the research and development side, the fund supported 
work on collision avoidance systems.
ADAP specifically provided that "not less than $250 million" would be spent 
annually on facilities and equipment alone. However, administrative budgets had 
treated this $250 million figure as a ceiling, not a floor on expenditures, in spite of
36 C om m ittee  on W ays and M eans, R eview , pp. 15-16.
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the fact that the fund had reached a $3 billion reserve and that many basic needs 
still existed. For example, in 1978 the NTSB submitted a list of basic needs to 
Congress that would, in their opinion, contribute the most to increasing aviation 
safety. This list included: ILS, runway grooving (a technique to keep aircraft from 
hydroplaning on wet runways), overrun (adding 1000 feet runway safety areas), 
VASI, windshear equipment, frangible approach light towers, and general aviation 
airport improvements. In his testimony before Congress, James King, NTSB 
Chairman, added that "in the apportionment of funds, the large hub airports receive 
the lion's share, whereas the general aviation airports get the least, and the 
relievers and air commuters come somewhere in between.
During the pre-strike period, therefore, the FAA had amassed a three billion 
dollar excess in the trust fund while not resolving the decade long problem of 
developing and implementing an effective collision avoidance system, while not 
taking any action to replace the en route computer system in spite of its many 
problems, and while not providing even basic facilities and equipment needs at all 
airports. Major hubs which deplaned large numbers of airline passengers may 
have been reasonably well-equipped, but smaller airports received less than what 
the NTSB considered adequate.
In 1980, Congress reacted. When ADAP came up for renewal, they did not 
grant it. The FAA received a clear message to spend the three billion dollar 
excess before any more users would be taxed. Congress did this knowing that the 
en route computer system would need to be replaced in the next decade, a project 
that could only be accomplished if they renewed ADAP.
^^ C o m m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation , Facility and Equipm ent Program s, pp. 1 -3 .
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The Human Equation: The Air Traffic Controller
The air traffic control system in the United States has always been heavily 
dependent on human intervention. Even with the most up -to -date  third generation 
equipment, it is still the controller who decides what speed, altitude, and direction 
each IFR flight should take. An accident killing hundreds of people can occur if the 
wrong decisions are made, or if the controller lacks alertness to all that is 
happening in his/her sector. The level of stress associated with the job became a 
key concern for controllers in the 1970s.
During the pre-strike period. Rose, Jenkins, and Hurst did a definitive study 
of controller stress. Commissioned by the FAA in the early 1970s to answer a 
series of questions on the nature and extent of health changes among air traffic 
controllers. Rose et al.  completed their three year study in December 1978. They 
concluded that "controllers had more hypertension than other groups, and possibly 
some forms of psychiatric problems were also more prevalent." They could not 
ascertain the cause of increased hypertension among air traffic controllers, saying 
that increased workload combined with genetic and biological factors of individuals 
seemed to be related to their likelihood of developing hypertension. The fact that 
a significant number of highly enthusiastic, competent controllers developed 
psychiatric problems during the course of the study surprised Rose et al. The 
development of psychiatric problems among these controllers appeared to be 
correlated with their attitudes towards work rather than with their workloads. 
These controllers appeared to be highly dissatisfied with their work environment, 
their co-workers, and/or the FAA.^® Over time, these controllers lost confidence in
^®U.S., D epartm ent of T ransportation , Federal Aviation A dm inistration, O ffice of A viation Medicine, 
"Air T ra ffic  C ontro ller H ealth Change Study," by Robert M. Rose, C. David Jenkins, and M ichael 
W . Hurst, in A viation M edical Reports, AM  Series, W ashington, D C., 1978, pp. 14 -15 .
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their ability to perform well without any outward signs that, in fact, their work 
performance had deteriorated.^®
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that workload per se does not appear to 
cause stress, although It may be contributive to the development of hypertension 
among air traffic controllers. Other theories concerning the stressfulness of air 
traffic control work focussed on aspects of the job other than workload. Finkelman 
and Kirschner suggested that information overload, or reaching the "limits of their 
channel capacity," might result in too much stress for controllers. In other words, 
if "there is a finite limit in the amount of information an individual can process," 
and if this limit is constantly pushed up against by the amount of data controllers 
must take in in order to make decisions, the result may be stress and an increased 
likelihood of making errors. Finkelman and Kirshner admitted that, for the most 
part, only anecdotal support existed for their theory, not empirical support."^®
Jones, Bowers, and Fuller, in a post-strike study which included both 
striking and non-striking controllers, proposed the theory that air traffic control 
work leads to acute episodic stress. In this theory, stress is experienced as a 
short-term  reaction to an incident, such as a near miss, which may result in a lack 
of self-confidence for a few hours or days. If such incidents recur and/or the 
work environment is perceived as non-supportive, the reaction may be longer and 
a controller s confidence in his/her ability to do the job may be seriously impaired. 
Acute episodic stress may be the link needed to explain the findings of Rose et al. 
that controllers likely to experience burnout are highly dissatisfied with their work 
environment. Jones et al. also found that controllers likely to experience burnout 
are highly dissatisfied with the work environment, as well as more likely to
®®lbid., p. 638.
4 0 ja y  M. Finkelm an and Carl Kirschner, "An In form ation -P rocessing  In terpretation  of Air T ra ffic  
C ontrol Stress," Hum an Factors 22 (O ctober 1980) : 5 6 2 -5 6 3 .
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experience Incidents of acute episodic stress which undermine their confidence 
and from which they increasingly have trouble bouncing back/*^
As the controllers' elected representatives, PATCO officials spoke frequently 
during the pre-strike period about the computer problems which plagued ARTCCs. 
They contended that computer outages, which forced controllers to switch from 
narrowband to broadband, caused a great deal of stress and could lead to serious 
safety hazards. When an outage occurred, information would suddenly not be 
available to controllers. In addition, controllers had no advance warning when an 
outage would occur, making it difficult to decide if the outage would be of long 
enough duration to warrant switching. Tom Galloway, an air traffic controller from  
the Leesburg, VA ARTCC, described what went on from the controllers perspective 
during an outage;
When you . . . decide to go to broadband mode, the first thing you 
have to do is get the scope down, which sometimes is easy and 
sometimes is hard to do. . . .
If I was working a high altitude sector where I was controlling air 
traffic from 24,000 feet up [then,] when I go to broadband, I see every 
aircraft in that airspace, approach control aircraft, aircraft at 7,000 feet,
12,000 feet, I see them all. . . .
. . .  I tell them all [the pilots of planes he is controlling] to key in 2100.
Then I select the same code. That way all the aircraft under my code 
appear as a double slash, and I can ident them as opposed to aircraft 
either over me or under my airspace. . . .
At that point, I can see the aircraft I am working, but I don't know 
which one is which. I have to have the captain ident, push a button on 
his transponder that will make his target on the radar blossom so that I 
can be sure that is him.
Federal A viation A dm in istration , "M anagem ent and Em ployee Relationships," pp. 44- 60.
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While I cannot ask more than one pilot to 'ident' because I will get 
more than one blossom, we get a 6-second sweep. If I had 20 aircraft, it 
would take me 2 minutes. . . .
During that same time, I am charged with not letting any aircraft in my 
sector cross another boundary without a handoff, which is very hard to 
do when you don't have them identified.
Furthermore, PATCO believed that increasing numbers of air traffic 
controllers had not received proper training to use broadband. Prior to 1974, most 
controllers worked on broadband. Since the widespread introduction of 
narrowband, however, many new controllers had little or no experience with 
broadband, while many long-term  controllers had not used broadband in several 
years. In 1979, PATCO estimated that eighty per cent of their membership, which 
consisted of close to ninety per cent of all controllers, had worked for the agency 
less than eight years.^^ At some ARTCCs, training opportunities to work on 
broadband existed only during the midnight shift when the computer was down for 
scheduled maintenance.'^'^
Throughout the pre-strike period, many FAA critics questioned the methods 
used by the FAA to determine staffing levels for ATC facilities. In 1978, Clifton von 
Kann, President of the Air Transportation Association which represents the 
scheduled airlines, testified that both the total number of air traffic controllers had 
declined in several facilities and the ratio of jouyneymen controllers to 
developmental controllers had declined.'^® The FAA countered that they re -
'^^Com m ittee on Public W orks and Transportation , S afety , pp. 3 9 3 -3 9 4 .
'^^Com m ittee on W ays and M eans, R ev iew , p. 38.
^ '^Com m ittee on Public W orks and Transportation . S afety , p.395.
^ ^ C o m m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation , Facility and Equipm ent Program s, p. 77.
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evaluated staffing requirements annually at each facility, and that this, in effect, 
"zero bases each facility."^® By using this technique, the FAA made it difficult to 
determine if staffing levels had declined because the FAA had overstaffed facilities 
in the past or because the FAA had changed staffing standards to meet perceived 
budget constraints.
PATCO also charged that a serious problem with overtime existed at some 
facilities. FAA officials started the year 1981 with the expectation that 600,000 
hours of overtime would be worked by air traffic controllers that year which would 
result in an average of th irty-one hours of overtime per controller. PATCO 
countered that, in fact, controllers worked little or no overtime in many facilities, 
while at other facilities controllers worked large amounts of overtime.
Controllers also had problems with getting accurate, u p -to -the -m inu te  
weather information. Although the FAA placed the center weather service units 
(CWSU) in ARTCCs during the pre-strike period to improve the timeliness and 
availability of weather information, they required that meteorologists only report to 
the weather service co-ordinator in each ARTCC (a duty usually tacked on to the 
other, primary duties of an ATC supervisor). This meant that during busy periods 
air traffic controllers often received no weather updates. James King, Chariman of 
the NTSB, testified before Congress that "only in slack nighttime periods do 
controllers in high-volume ATC centers have the opportunity to informally 
participate [sic] in weather information transfer.'"^® The FAA insisted that 
dissemination of weather information could be improved through research and
"^®lbid., p. 170.
^^U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Post O ffice and Civil Service, O versight on Grievances of A[r 
T ra ffic  Specialists. H earings before the subcom m ittee on Com pensation and Em ployee Benefits of the  
C om m ittee  on Post O ffice and Civil Service, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, pp. 2 2 -2 3 .
^ ^ C o m m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation , Im pact of W eath er, p. 25.
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development of improved systems. However, controllers, the NTSB, and others 
concerned with the problem saw the solution as one of improved communication. 
They advocated allowing controllers and meteorologists to speak directly with each 
other, and/or giving controllers direct access to the weather radar (RRWDS) used 
by the meteorologists.'^®
The Provision of Services: How Much, How Safe?
There are three categories of users of the national airspace —  air carriers, 
which include aircraft which transport people and cargo for hire; general aviation, 
which includes all other civil aviation; and military aircraft. Air carrier traffic can 
be further divided into large airlines in scheduled service, commuter carriers in 
scheduled service, and 'on-demand' air taxis in unscheduled operations.^® During 
the pre-strike period, the commuter, air taxi, and general aviation aircraft increased 
their demand on the air traffic control system, while airline demand remained fairly 
stable. Table 11-1 on page 27 shows the number of IFR aircraft handled at ARTCCs 
from fiscal year 1978 through fiscal year 1981. Since fiscal years begin October 1 
and end September 30, this table includes only two months of post-strike statistics 
and, therefore, closely matches the defined pre-strike period.
General aviation flights had the highest aircraft accident and fatality rates 
during the pre-strike period, followed by air taxis, commuter planes, and airlines. 
Table 11-2 on page 28 gives accident rates per 100,000 hours flight time for each 
category. Tables 11-3, 11-4, and 11-5 give the total number of accidents for each 
category, the total number of fatal accidents, and the total number of fatalities for 
each year. These tables include all aviation accidents, whether or not the plane
^®lbid., p. 30.
®®U.S., D epartm ent of T ransportation , Federal A viation A dm inistration, In form ation  Analysis Branch. 
FAA S ta tis tica l Handbook ^  A viation , W ashington, D C ., 1981, p. 143.
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Table I I - l ;  IFR AIR TRAFFIC ACTIVITY FOR FISCAL YEARS 1978-1981
TOTAL
AIR
CARRIER
AIR
TAXI
GENERAL
AVIATION MILITARY
1978
T o ta l 33,456,726 10,421,496 3,066,809 16,310,259 3,658,162
Change + 6 % + 4 % +20 % +8 % -  2 %
1979
T o ta l 36,225,027 10,737,637 3,657,696 17,907,628 3,922,066
Change + 8 % + 3 % + 19 % + 10 % + 7 %
1980
T o ta l 38,176,549 10,613,262 4,128,782 19,332,557 4,101,948
Change + 5 % -  1 % + 13 % + 8 % + 5 %
1981
T o ta l 37,221,490 10,164,678 4,635,285 18,530,746 3,890,781
Change -  3 % — 4 % + 12 % -  4 % -  5 %
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Information Analysis Branch,FAA S ta tis tic a l Handbook o f A viation. Washington, D C. 
1981, p. 12; 1983, p. 14.
was stationary on the ground or in flight, flying VFR or IFR. The numbers indicate 
that aviation accidents are considerably less fatal than highway accidents in which 
approximately 50,000 people die each year in the United States.
During the pre-strike period, only one midair collision involving an airline 
aircraft occurred. This accident killed 163 people in September 1978 in San Diego. 
It was the first major airline midair collision since 1972. Midair collisions, involving
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Table II-2 :  ACCIDENT RATES FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1978-1981
Rates are for number of accidents per 100,000 hours flight time.
AIRLINES^ COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATION®
1978
T o ta l 0.348 4.68 5.58 12.10
F a ta l 0.083 1.08 1.52 2.06
1979
T o ta l 0.358 4.44 4.34 9.90
F a ta l 0.060 1.28 0.81 1.65
1980
T o ta l 0.221 3.23 4.70 9.90
F a ta l 0.000 0.68 1.24 1.71
1981
T o ta l 0.380 2.50 5.42 9.50
F a ta l 0.061 0.73 1.38 1.78
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual Report tc
Congress, Washington, D.C., 1978-1983.
GRates do not include sabotage/suicide accidents.
major air carriers, although increasingly infrequent, cause a major public outcry 
because they result in so many deaths at one time and because they occur in an 
environment which passengers enter and pay for with the expectation that they 
will be protected. People expect the air traffic control system to perform  
flawlessly.
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Table II-3 :  AVIATION ACCIDENTS FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1978 -  1981
YEAR AIRLINES COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATION
1978 21 61 198 4,218
1979 24 52 160 3,825
1980 15 38 170 3,597
1981 25 31 157 3,502
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation 
Congress, Washington, D C., 1978-1983.
Safety Board, Annual R eport to
Table II-4 : FATAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1978 -  1981
YEAR AIRLINES COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATION
1978 5 14 54 721
1979 4 15 30 638
1980 0 8 45 622
1981 4 9 40 654
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual R eport to 
Congress, Washington, D C., 1978-1983.
Congress established the FAA in response to a 1956 midair collision 
between two air carriers over the Grand Canyon. Since that time, there have been
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Table I I -5 :  FATALITIES IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS FOR CALENDAR YRS. 1978 -  1981
YEAR AIRLINES COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATIONS
1978 160 48 155 1,558
1979 351 66 77 1,237
1980 0 37 103 1,252
1981 4 34 94 1,282
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual Report to 
Congress, Washington, D C., 1978-1983.
^includes air carrier fatalities when in collision with general aviation aircraft.
tw enty-five more midair collisions involving an air carrier. Most of these accidents 
have occurred during visual flight conditions between an air carrier operating 
under IFR and another aircraft, usually general aviation, flying VFR. Shortly after 
the 1978 midair collision, James King, Chairman of the NTSB, testified that it was 
not "purely coincidental" that six years passed between the last two midair 
collisions. He maintained that "the expansion of radar coverage throughout the 
national airspace system, the installation of automated radar-tracking services at 
major terminal facilities, the further addition of systems to alert controllers to 
potential conflicts, the expansion of positive control airspace have all had an effect 
on the air carrier aircraft exposure to the collision threat."^^ The number of midair 
collisions, however, is only one standard by which to judge the safety of the ATC 
system. It is necessary also to look at statistics on the frequency of near misses.
Joint C om m ittee  on C om m erce, Science, and Transportation  and C om m ittee  on Public W orks and 
sportation. A viation , pp. 7 -8 .
51
T ra n
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system errors, and computer failures in order to fully judge the system's 
performance. A system error is when horizontal separation between two aircraft is 
less than five miles and vertical separation is less than 1000 feet. A near miss is 
when horizontal separation is less than one mile and vertical separation is less 
than 500 feet and where one or both pilots is surprised at the presence of the 
other.®^ FAA statistics for the nine years from 1970 to 1978 showed that the total 
number of system errors increased by 200 per cent, while the frequency of system 
errors based on total traffic handled increased by 160 per cent.^^
In April 1976, NASA and the FAA reached an agreement which allowed 
system errors and near misses to be reported to NASA with limited liability for the 
individual filing the report. In all probability, this program increased the number of 
reported system errors and near misses because, under the program, an individual 
reporting an incident for which s/he bore responsiblity could do so anonymously 
and be guaranteed protection from prosecution if his/her actions had not involved 
criminal negligence. The FAA argued that NASA did not collect accurate data 
under this program because NASA could not verify if an alleged incident had, in 
fact, occurred. Therefore, the FAA and NASA maintained conflicting accounts of 
the number of incidents which had occurred. For example, in 1978 the FAA listed 
503 near midairs, up 176 per cent since 1974; that same year NASA averaged 
almost 100 reports per month of near midair collisions.
On the other hand, PATCO and many Congressmen criticized the FAA's 
statistics. At a 1980 Congressional hearing. Representative Bob Whittaker of
® ^C om m ittee on Public W orks and Transportation , S afe ty , p. 95.
S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on G overnm ent O perations, FAA Aviation S afety  Reporting  
System . H earings before a subcom m ittee  of the House C om m ittee  on Governm ent O perations, 96th  
Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 151.
^^C om m ittee  on W ays and M eans, R eview , p. 49.
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Kansas charged that the FAA had covered up system errors and near misses. 
Representative Whittaker, relying on data collected by the Aviation Safety Institute, 
an Independent organization which gathers data via a to ll-free hotline utilized by 
workers in the aviation industry, charged that twenty-e ight near misses had 
recently occurred and gone unreported by the FAA.^®
PATCO expressed particular concern that system errors and near misses 
might increase with the occurrence of computer outages. A computer outage, as 
defined by the FAA, is "any period of time of greater than one minute in which 
either the entire computer input or output is u n u s a b l e . I n t e r r u p t i o n s  of less 
than one minute are called startovers. The FAA claimed that unscheduled 
startovers and outages declined annually from 1976 to 1980 from an average of 
two unscheduled outages per ARTCC per week to one per week.^^
FAA critics charged that the internal reporting system could not be relied 
upon. In 1979 Stanley Lyman, speaking for the electronics technicians of the FAA's 
field maintenance staff (FASTA), testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means that:
the Personal Evaluation Records on which [technicians'] annual ratings 
are based use the failure rate of maintained equipment as a primary basis 
for evaluation. . . . Technicians responsible for old or unusually faulty 
equipment, and groups which are severely understaffed, are going to 
receive poor records through no fault of their own. . . . [This] has made 
technicians susceptible to subtle but clear pressure from first line 
supervisors, system engineers and sector managers to make the NAS 
system look reliable. Consequently, it is all too common for unscheduled
®^U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Governm ent Operations, ^  T raffle Control C om puter 
Failures. H earings before a subcom m ittee  o f t ^  House C om m ittee  on Governm ent O perations. 96th  
Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, p. 32.
®®Com m ittee on Public W orks and Transportation , S afe ty , p. 94.
^ ^ C o m m ittee  on G overnm ent O perations, C om puter Failures, p. 37.
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outages to go down as scheduled ones and for short outages to appear 
in the records as interruptions. . . . Unscheduled outage reports are 
further falsified by such administrative decisions as turning an 
unscheduled outage into a scheduled one when it appears that the 
system is going to be down for a while.
Furthermore, Lyman charged that the reporting system did not include outages 
caused by commercial power failures, software problems, or other non-equipment 
failures.^® The FAA apparently accepted at least some of this criticism because in 
March 1980 they sent a notice to all en route and terminal facilities stating that 
interruption reports had not consistently differentiated scheduled outages from 
unscheduled ones, and that this practice must stop.®®
FAA statistics also indicated that switching from narrowband to broadband 
and use of broadband did not increase the occurrence of system errors and near 
misses. Using data compiled from 1977 through 1980, the FAA concluded that the 
en route centers had used broadband an average of ten per cent of the time in en 
route centers, yet only four per cent of the system errors which occurred 
happened during the use of broadband.®® PATCO countered that the FAA used 
these data to mislead the public. Controllers used broadband regularly during the 
midnight shift when the computer underwent routine maintenance. Since the 
controllers worked less than five per cent of the total traffic during this shift, any 
data on broadband which included its use during this shift would not accurately 
discern whether the use of broadband during sudden outages, in heavy traffic 
created a safety problem.®^
®®Com m ittee on W ays and M eans, R ev iew , pp. 120 -121 . 
®®Com m ittee on G overnm ent Operations, C om puter Failures, p. 44.
®®lbld., p.4.
® ^C om m lttee on Public W orks and Transportation , S afe ty , p. 395.
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Throughout the pre-strike period, specific incidents occurred which 
indicated that the possibility of a major air carrier midair collision still existed. 
According to the Aviation Safety Institute, the Indianapolis en route center reported 
tw enty -four outages in August, twenty-seven in September, and sixty-eight in 
October 1979. The New York ARTCC underwent a forty-eight hour outage in 
November 1979. In December 1978 two military jets came within seventy-five feet 
of each other during a tw o and a half hour computer outage at the Leesburg, VA 
en route center. In San Diego, a year after the midair collision that killed 163 
people, three near misses involving major airline aircraft occurred during one 
weekend.®^
In spite of these incidents, the FAA did not address the problems of an 
aging computer system and a work environment for controllers that caused some 
of the most enthusiastic workers to "punch out" because of real or feigned 
psychiatric problems. FAA officials insisted that switching from narrowband to 
broadband and even from broadband to a totally manual, first generation system 
resulted only in a lack of efficiency in the system and a "source of aggravation for 
our controller workforce.'"®^ They did not address the concern that increased 
traffic loads (up eighty per cent since 1970),®^ which could be handled with state-  
o f- th e -a r t  equipment, may have been simply unmangeable using broadband or 
manual control.
Critics charged that the FAA had more concern for appearing to have 
improved the system than they did for trying to create the safest ATC system 
possible by actively seeking out and correcting problems within the system. The
® ^C om m ittee  on W ays and M eans, Rev iew , pp. 8 -3 .
®^lbid., p. 91
® ^C om m ittee on G overnm ent Operations, S afety  Reporting S ystem , p. 151.
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large, unspent balance in the trust fund, the age of the en route computer system 
and the lack of any developed plans to replace it, the inability of the FAA even to 
decide on a collision avoidance system much less develop and utilize one, the 
unmet need for even basic improvements at many airports and the growing 
dissatisfaction among air traffic controllers that culminated in the 1981 strike 
strenghthened their case.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter ill
THE PATCO STRIKE AND THE IMMEDIATE POST-STRIKE PERIOD
When PATCO struck on August 3, 1981, pulling nearly seventy per cent of 
the controller workforce out of terminals and ARTCCs nationwide, it did not come 
as a surprise. Both PATCO and the FAA had prepared openly for the strike for at 
least two years. Congress had held hearings during the early part of 1981 in an 
attempt to avert the strike, but both sides seemed determined to have a 
showdown. Langhorne Bond, FAA administrator under President Carter and the 
initiator of the contingency plan, said in a post-strike interview that as early as 
1978 he realized that "normal discourse betwen labor and management did not 
seem to apply in a situation where the other party had become so divorced from 
reality. . . .  It did become clear to me that firm response was the only real way to 
deal with this problem, because that was the only way of bringing reality to these 
people. At least, hopefully, folks would understand that if they did something 
illegal, there would be some response to it."®® If PATCO believed that the 
controllers' interests could be achieved through a strike, the FAA appeared to be 
equally convinced that only a strike would allow them to achieve their interests.
®®Quoted in Don Francke, "The FAA's Finest Hour . . . An In terv iew  w ith  Langhorne M. Bond, fo rm er  
FAA A dm in istrator," Journal of ^  T ra ffic  C ontro l, January-W larch 1982 in U.S., Congress, House, 
C o m m ittee  on Post O ffice  and Civil Service, ^  T ra ffic  C ontrol R evitalization Act of 1981. H earings  
b efo re  the C om m ittee  on Post O ffice and Civil S ervice, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1 9 8 1 -1 9 8 2 , pp. 
3 9 5 -3 9 7 .
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The Strike Contingency Plan
On August 3, the FAA enacted Special Federal Air Regulation (SFAR) 44, also 
known as the 7 5 -5 0  plan, so that the strike contingency plan could be enforced. 
This plan cut scheduled air carrier operations nationwide, allowing only seventy- 
five per cent of pre-strike operations to occur. It also cut operations at the 
nation's tw enty-three  major airports (later changed to tw enty-tw o) by fifty per 
cent. In addition, the plan forbid aircraft with a gross weight of 12,500 pounds or 
less to fly IFR, except for scheduled air taxi operations. During the first months of 
the strike, the FAA made certain adjustments to SFAR 44. One adjustment allowed 
small planes to fly IFR Another adjustment changed the arbitrary fifty per cent cut 
in operations at major airports to a more locally flexible system.®® The plan also 
restricted IFR flights by general aviation and military flights within civilian airspace, 
resulting in an overall traffic rate of seventy-eight to eighty-two per cent of pre­
strike levels.®^
The ATC system could handle this level of traffic for several reasons. First, 
the FAA further restricted the air carrier operations allowed to occur by enforcing 
a flow control plan developed in cooperation with the major airlines. This plan 
scheduled flights throughout the day, spacing them at a steady rate rather than 
allowing peaks and valleys of traffic. Prior to the strike, FAA administrator J. Lynn 
Helms had estimated that the FAA had overstaffed the ATC system by 2,000 to
3,000 controllers primarily because of the FAA policy of staffing all facilities to
®®U.S., N ationa l T ransporta tion  Safety  Board, "Special Investigation Report. Air T ra ffic  Control 
System ," in A viation  Safety: A ir T ra ffic  Control (PATCO W alkout). Hearings before the subcom m ittee  on 
Investigations and Oversight of the C om m ittee  on Public Works and Transportation , 97th Cong., 1st and 
2nd sess., 1 9 8 1 -1 9 8 2 , pp. 5 7 8 -5 7 9 .
®^y.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation, Aviation Safety: Air T ra ffle  
C ontrol (PATCO W alkout). Hearings before  the subcom m ittee  on Investigations and O versight of the  
C om m ittee  on Public W orks and Transporta tion , 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1981 -1982 , p. 557.
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handle peak traffic periods.®® By smoothing out traffic peaks, the FAA decreased 
the demands on individual controllers which resulted from working heavy traffic. 
In exchange, however, controllers had to spend more time actually working traffic 
each shift. They increased their time working traffic from an average of three and 
a half to four hours per day to at least six hours per day.
Second, the FAA combined individual sectors at many ARTCCs so that an 
airspace formerly divided between two or more controllers could now be handled 
by one controller. Again, the flow control plan, which spread the traffic load 
evenly throughout the day, made combining sectors possible because without peak 
traffic periods the maximum number of sectors in each facility did not have to be 
u t i l i z e d . I n  addition, the FAA transferred airspace between some ARTCCs, so that 
the area of responsibility for ARTCCs where many controllers struck decreased, 
while the ARTCCs less heavily impacted by the strike increased their areas of 
responsibility.^®
Third, the FAA assigned a large number of individuals to control traffic who, 
before the strike, had not controlled traffic on a regular basis. This included just 
over a thousand employees in managment positions who had previously risen from  
the ranks of controllers. The FAA had them recertified during the months just 
prior to the strike. Another 3,000 facility supervisors who regularly did air traffic 
control work during peak periods became full-tim e controllers. To assist the 
working controllers further, the FAA brought in approximately 800 military 
controllers. The military personnel received on -th e-job  training to bring them up
®®lbid., p. 676.
®®lbid., pp. 5 5 7 -5 5 8 .
^®U.S., Congress, House, C om m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation, Status of the Air T ra ffic  
C ontrol System . H earings before  the  subcom m ittee on Investigations and Oversight of the  C om m ittee  
on Public W orks and T ran spo rta tio n , 98th  Cong.. 1st and 2nd sess., 1983 -1984 , p. 493.
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to civilian ATC standards. The FAA rehired a small number of retired controllers 
on a reemployed annuitant basis. Fifty-four requalified to work traffic while others 
performed training, staff, and administrative functions. The FAA also closed 
seventy less active towers and temporarily reassigned non-striking personnel from 
these facilities to operating facilities. In addition, other staff, not trained to control 
traffic, as well as former pilots hired by the FAA, took over bookkeeping duties 
normally done by controllers.^’
The FAA extended the work week for all employees to sixty hours per week  
throughout August, while postponing vacation and other leave indefinitely.''^ In 
early September, the FAA cut back the scheduled work week to forty-eight hours 
for seventy per cent of the controllers, while scheduling the remainder to work 
forty hours per week.''^
A significant decrease in computer downtime also helped the working 
controllers. Although some controversy existed as to why downtime decreased, 
the NTSB reported that most likely "the lower number of aircraft and flight plans in 
the system and a restriction on software program revisions and updates"^'’ caused 
the computers to go down less frequently.
There can be no doubt that, during the first months after the strike the 
contingency plan successfully maintained the ATC system at a level of operations 
which satisfied system users. However, a study done by the National 
Transportation Safety Board during the first two months of the strike pointed out
^ ’ N ational T ransportation  S afe ty  Board, "Special investigation," pp. 580 -5 8 1 . 
''^Federal A viation A dm in istration , "'Adjustments in A ir T ra ffic  Service,'" p. 119. 
^^N ationa l T ransporta tion  S afety  Board, "Special Investigation, " p. 581. 
^^ C o m m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation , A viation S afety , p. 559.
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several potential problems with the plan. The FAA had no program to deal with 
stress and fatigue. Initially, most working controllers insisted that they did not 
suffer from stress and fatigue. In fact, many believed that "the stress walked out 
on August 3."^^ The Board, however, believed that long hours with little relief 
would eventually take their toll. The Board found that although by September, the 
FAA scheduled maximum work weeks of forty-eight hour, many controllers still 
worked additional overtime. Also, first line supervisors, who had previously been 
available to take over for a controller who had too much traffic to handle or who 
became ill, now worked traffic themselves. This left many facilities without any 
emergency backup/® Furthermore, the Board found that while the flow control 
system successfully worked on a nationwide basis, some individual facilities and 
some individual controllers experienced heavy traffic peaks.
The Board also questioned how the system would be rebuilt. The FAA 
planned to replace the striking controllers with newly trained controllers by 
January 1, 1984.^^ This would be done by having two shifts at a time go through 
an eleven week training session at the FAA's Oklahoma center, followed by further 
training in the individual facilities.^® The FAA made only three changes from pre­
strike training standards. First, prior to the strike, trainee controllers had spent 
seventeen weeks at the center in Oklahoma, which included a six week course on 
radar. Since no developmental controller worked on radar until after s/he had 
trained in a facility for a year, the FAA decided to postpone the six week radar 
training for one year. This enabled developmental controllers to be in the facilities
^®lbid., p.677.
^®lbid., p. 558.
^^Ibid., p. 7.
^®Federal A viation A dm in istration , "Adjustm ents in A ir T ra ffic  Service," p. 121.
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Six weeks earlier, working non-radar positions and learning skills on the job which 
would presumably increase their proficiency once they began radar training. 
Second, the FAA accelerated the rate of training so that a controller could reach 
full performance level (FPL) as soon as s/he could do the work. Previously, it took 
approximately five years to become an FPL controller. The FAA stated that they 
had developed the old policy primarily because it took that long to promote 
controllers through the ranks and not because it took that long to learn the 
necessary skills to be an FPL controller.^® Third, the FAA designated a new 
category of controller, operational controller. This designation certified that a 
controller qualified on two or more radar sectors or control positions. Operational 
controllers did not qualify at all sectors and positions within a facility as did FPL 
controllers. This provided facilities with controllers fully qualified to work in 
specialized areas, but lacking the flexibility of FPL controllers.®® These changes in 
training requirements helped keep the ATC system running during the pre-strike 
period. However, in order to fully rebuild the system, the FAA still had to complete 
the training of enough operational controllers to replace the controllers who went 
on strike.
The NTSB investigation found these changes to be reasonable. However, 
the Board questioned the ability of the FAA to train 6,000 controllers by January 
1984. James King, Chairman of the NTSB, stated that a more reasonable 
expectation would be for the FAA to attain full staffing by January 1985.®^ Second,
^®Prior to  the  strike, PATCO and the FAA had not negotiated  train ing standards and practices  
because the FAA had successfully kept all train ing decisions to them selves as a m anagem ent 
perogative. The fiv e -y e a r train ing period fo r developm ental contro llers had been d ictated  by the 
O ffice  of Personnel M anagem ent (OPM). W hen the FAA changed this policy during the  p ost-s trike  
period, they had to get special d ispensation from  OPM in order to prom ote individuals m ore quickly 
than civil service standards norm ally  perm itted .
®®Com m ittee on Public W orks and Transportation , Aviation S afe ty , pp. 5 8 6 -5 8 9 .
®^lbid., p. 560.
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the report stated that developmental controllers might not be qualified to handle 
normal traffic loads when the time came because they had trained in facilities with 
controlled traffic conditions. Also, since many training specialists in the facilities 
now worked as controllers, the Board expressed concern that quality training 
programs in the facilities might not be possible to maintain.®^ Working controllers, 
many already anxious about the long term effects of working extended hours, 
expressed reluctance to take on the extra training duties which would be 
necessary to rebuild the system since such duties "were more tiring . . . and 
increased the workload."®^
The Board also raised the concern that the policy to replace striking air 
traffic controllers with newly trained controllers did not sufficiently address the 
basic problems which caused the strike. James King summed up his feelings 
about the policy when he testified before a Congressional subcommittee. He said, 
if the FAA keeps the same management and the same management philosophy
"we may be back here 12 years from now having the same discussion."®'^ Later in
his testimony, Mr. King addressed the issue of stress among the controllers and 
management's attitude:
The . . . question is, does management presently in the FAA recognize 
stress? and what have we seen, the general attitude we got, and I will
give you a direct quote, 'Anyone here thinks it is stressful, he can get out
now.'®®
Clearly, a contingency plan which only addressed maintaining certain volumes of
®^Nat(onal T ransporta tion  Safety  Board, "Special Investigation," p. 589. 
®®!btd.. p. 604.
® '*C om m ittee on Public W orks and Transportation , A viation S afe ty , p. 653. 
®®lbid., p. 658.
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traffic at certain levels of safety, while replacing certain numbers of controllers, 
sidestepped the whole question of why the strike had occurred and whether or not 
the ATC system could be rebuilt in such a way that future labor problems would 
be solved in a productive and cooperative manner.
For the Record: The Im pact on Volume and Safety of Air Traffic
The strike had less of an impact on the volume of air traffic than PATCO 
expected after pulling out so many controllers. The FAA initially cut air carrier 
flights by tw enty-five  per cent, but operations gradually increased during the first 
two months by eight per cent. In early October, the FAA cut back again by five 
per cent because of increasing delays and heavy workloads, so that during the 
remainder of the immediate post-strike period air carrier operations leveled off at 
seventy-eight per cent of pre-strike levels,®®
General aviation operations within the ATC system also declined. During 
the first months of the strike, due to good weather, many general aviation pilots 
could operate under visual flight rules. With the approach of winter weather, the 
FAA established a General Aviation Reservation Program which restricted access to 
the ATC system. During the 1982 fiscal year, general aviation flights decreased 
tw enty -five  per cent from the previous year.®?
During the first months of the strike, the NTSB judged that the ATC system 
continued to operate safely. However, the Board admitted to many difficulties in 
making a determination. Five organizations collected data on system errors and 
near misses during the pre - and immediate post-strike periods —  the FAA, the
®®National Transportation  S afe ty  Board, "Special investigation," p. 579. 
®?Federal A viation A dm in istration , S tatis tica l Handbook, 1982, p. 14.
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Aviation Safety Institute, the Air Line Pilots Association, PATCO, and NASA. In
comparing data from the first four groups, the NTSB report concluded:
Judgments about the ATC system performance based on reports from  
any one organization are of questionable statistical value because of the 
lack of correlation among the reports from all sources. However, the fact 
that 73 per cent of the reported operational errors and near midair 
collisions occurred within the first 2 weeks of the strike suggests there 
was some relationship between the errors and the reconstituted 
controller workforce. Furthermore, only 9 of the 28 near mid air 
collisions reported by the FAA were recorded by the other three 
organizations. This fact indicates an apparent lack of reporting 
effectiveness in the PATCO, ASI, and ALPA systems, a reluctance of 
persons to file official near midair collision reports with the FAA, or 
differences in definition by the organizations.
The Board chose to use the data collected by NASA during August and
September to make their judgment on the system. Table III-1 shows the
tabulation for operational errors. From 1980 to 1981, operational errors decreased 
in both terminal and ARTCC airspace. In total, operational errors decreased from 
fifty-four in August 1980 to twenty-four in August 1981 and from fifty -tw o in 
September 1980 to tw enty-one in September 1981. Near misses also declined 
from forty-five and forty-four in August and September 1980 to fourteen and 
tw enty -four in August and September 1981, respectively. However, the Board 
qualified the reliability of these data by noting that the NASA reporting system 
records incidents by the month a report is received rather than by the month the 
incident occurred.®®
The data indicate that system errors and near misses decreased from pre-  
strike levels. The Board gave two reasons to explain this reduction;
The most obvious reason was the reduction in IFR flying by as much as 
20 to 30 per cent at many facilities. The second reason was the
®®IVational T ransporta tion  S afe ty  Board, "Special Investigation," p. 585.
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Table I I I - l :  OPERATIONAL ERRORS REPORTED TO NASA
Table includes all months in NTSB study
AUGUST  
1980 1981
SEPTEMBER 
1980 1981
T erm inal Areas 26 17 26 15
A R T C C s 28 7 26 6
T o ta l 54 24 52 21
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, "Special Investigation 
Report. Air Traffic Control System," in A viation  Safety: A ir  T ra ff ic  C ontrol [PA TC O  
W alkout], Hearings before  the Subcom m ittee on Investigations and Oversight o f the  
C o m m ittee  on Public  Works and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 
1981-1982, p. 585.
increased separation distances between aircraft that were used in the 
poststrike ATC system.
The Board also investigated the possibility that incidents did not get 
reported. They concluded that no organized cover up had occurred, but did 
indicate that controllers may not have reported some less severe incidents 
because they did not have enough time to complete the paperwork or because 
individuals controlling traffic who had not done so routinely prior to the strike 
might not have known about the NASA reporting program.®^
In the spring of 1982, the contingency plan could be considered a success. 
Although two serious air carrier accidents had occurred in January, neither could
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be attributed to a failure in the ATC system. The FAA had kept the majority of 
planes in the sky without exposing them to a measurable decline in safety 
standards. They did this first by cutting the number of flights in the system by 
approximately tw enty-five  per cent of pre-strike levels, and second by instituting 
flow control. This stabilized the number of flights throughout the day and 
enforced increased separation standards between flights so that controllers did not 
have to handle peak traffic loads.
The true test of the FAA's ability to take a strike and to fire 11,400 air traffic 
controllers remained in the future. The ATC system still faced at least three years 
of slow rebuilding. During these years, the flying public would expect the FAA to 
increase traffic loads to pre-strike levels or greater. At the same time, the FAA 
would have to fully train replacement controllers, assure that the demands on 
working controllers did not become too stressful, and work to alleviate the internal 
labor problems which brought about the strike in the first place. Most importantly, 
the FAA would have to build a safe system which could be relied upon at all times 
and under all conditions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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THREE YEARS LATER: HAS TECHNOLOGY REPLACED THE STRIKERS? 
Developments in Technology Since the Strike
Since the PATCO strike, the FAA has made one major technological 
contribution to the development of the National Airspace System —  the National 
Airspace System Plan. First proposed in January 1982, the Office of Technology 
Assessment called it "a significant and even bold step compared to previous FAA 
efforts to chart a future course for the ATC system."®® While this plan directly 
responded to the problems and concerns about the adequacy of NAS technology  
raised during the pre-strike period, it also recognized that during the first years 
after the strike no significant changes in technology would occur, instead, through 
1985, the plan called for maintaining and improving the efficiency of NAS 
components where possible, while developing and procuring new technologies 
which would be implemented beginning in the late 1980s.
For example, in en route centers the plan calls for rehosting software with 
some improvements on IBM 4341 computers by 1986. During the interim, the FAA 
implemented minor improvements to the 9020 hardware. At terminals with ARTS, 
the post-strike period saw improvements in efficiency primarily aimed at providing 
controllers with conflict alerts. During this period, the FAA also replaced vacuum -  
tube ILS equipment with solid-state equipment. Work on developing and 
implementing TCAS also continued throughout the post-strike period. In the area 
of improved weather technology, the House Subcommittee on Investigations and
®®U.S., Congress, O ffice of Technology Assessm ent, R eview  of the FAA 1982 N ational A irspace  
System  Plan, 97th  Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, p. 9.
47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation issued a report in 
November 1984. This report stated that in spite of major R & D expenditures, the 
FAA had made no significant improvements since the strike in weather-related  
aviation technology, nor had they made improvements in simply communicating 
weather hazards to the controllers and pilots who needed the information.®^
The FAA made one technological improvement available to post-strike 
controllers. They had implemented the direct access radar channel (DARC) at most 
en route centers during the summer of 1981. The FAA promoted DARC as a 
backup system to narrowband during a computer failure. DARC interprets raw data 
from the secondary surveillance radar so that the controller is provided with data 
on each flight in alphanumeric form. However, controllers shifting to DARC must 
still manually shift their display screens from a vertical to a horizontal position. 
Furthermore, the data provided by DARC is not actually displayed on the screen, 
thus, the controller must make up an identifying marker for each flight s/he is 
working.®^ DARC cut down on some of the communication necessary between  
controller and pilot during a computer failure, but still required controllers to 
perform several distracting tasks in order to continue tracking airplanes.
Computer downtime became a non-issue during the post-strike period. 
John Galipault, President of the Aviation Safety Institute, believes that the FAA has 
deliberately tried to bury any knowledge of what's going on.®® In April 1984, the 
FAA sponsored a National Automation Conference attended by the people who 
develop and maintain ATC system software. The conference turned into a planning 
session to save the automation system. In a summary of conference proceedings.
C om m ittee  on Public W orks and Transportation , Innpact of W ea th er, p. 11.
®^Office o f Technology Assessm ent, A irport and A ir T ra ffic  C ontro l, p. 72.
®®lnterview w ith  John G alipault, A viation S afe ty  Institute, W orth ington , Ohio, 15 February 1985.
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Bob Kelm, Assistant Manager for Automation at Los Angeles TRACON, stated that 
"automation in the Air Traffic Service, if not in the FAA, has reached a crisis." He 
described the primary problems as loss of automation specialists to the private 
sector, cutbacks in trainees at the FAA Academy, splitting up of automation 
responsibilities within the FAA resulting in "responsibilities falling through cracks," 
and loss of configuration management so that national problems have to be solved 
locally. The report tells of automation specialists required to put in "illegal 
patches" and of others using "their own home computers for system debugging." 
Although the report concludes that if the recovery plan developed during the 
conference is put into action the system can be saved "before breakdowns occur," 
it is obvious that the management of the automation system has deteriorated 
during the post-strike period.
Throughout the post-strike period, the air traffic controllers have worked 
with the same technology as their pre-strike counterparts. In developing a long 
range plan, the FAA has taken a necessary and major step toward implementing 
s ta te -o f - th e -a r t  technology and advancing the ATC system into a new generation. 
It has not, however, aided post-strike controllers in performing their job, nor has it 
contributed to the overall safety of the ATC system since the 1981 strike.
On the Job: The Working Air Traffic Controllers in a Post-Strike  
Environment
In March 1982, Robert Jones et a l. published a report which described the 
attitudes air traffic controllers had towards their work. The study included both 
working and striking controllers as well as other FAA employees working in the 
ATC system. Any study of working controllers three years after the strike would 
have to use the Jones report as a model.
^^U.S., D epartm ent of T ransportation , Federal A viation A dm in istration , Los Angeles TRACON, "Report 
from  the  N ational A utom ation  C onference," by Robert Kelm, pp. 1 -3 . (M im eographed.)
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Jones et a l. used the Survey o f O rganizations  (SOO) to determine how FAA 
employees perceived organizational climate, supervisory leadership, peer 
relationships and outcomes, i.e., "conditions of teamwork, satisfaction, and 
motivation."®® In addition, they asked respondents forty-six supplementary 
questions which dealt with such problems as stress and burnout. Theory X 
management beliefs, and equipment outages.®® The results showed that out of 
tw enty-one job classifications within the FAA, only secretaries and clerical 
employees among bottom-ranked classifications, and top level management in five 
categories —  Assistant Chiefs, Deputy Chiefs and assistant Sector Managers, 
System Engineers, Facility Staff Officers, and Division Chiefs and their Assistants 
—  gave the FAA a positive rating.®^ All other employees, including striking and 
non-striking controllers, facility chiefs, regional and Washington office specialists 
and technicians, team supervisors, administrative personnel, etc., rated the FAA 
negatively, with the difference between classifications being primarily to what 
degree they rated the job negatively,®® Jones et a l. concluded that for most FAA 
employees:
Morale is very poor, at almost all levels. Stress, while at no time 
widely characteristic of the controller work force, is real, episodic in form, 
and affects a majority of longer-service controllers. A generation gap of 
considerable magnitude, around the treatment of employees, exists in Air 
Traffic. Negative organizational conditions, treatment, and experiences.
®®Federal A viation  A dm in istration , “M anagem ent and Em ployee Relationships,’' p. 17.
^®Oavid G. Bowers, "What W ould  M ake 11.500 People Quit Their Jobs?" O rganizational Dynam ics 11 
(W in te r 1983) ; 9.
®^Federal A viation  A dm in istration , "M anagem ent and Em ployee Relationships,"" p. 64.
^®Bowers, "'What W ould Make?" p. 11
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not peer pressure, caused most individuals to decide to strike, Other 
groups still working, display many of these same perceptions.®^
By the fail of 1983, evidence began to mount that working controllers again 
felt strong dissatisfaction with the workplace, replacing any lingering esprit de 
corps that helped make the immediate post-strike period so successful. In 
October of that year, the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of 
the Committee on Public Works and Transportation heard testimony from three 
controllers and a military liason and security specialist representing the Los 
Angeles and Leesburg, VA ARTCCs. Gregory McGuirk, a controller from Leesburg, 
testified that:
The fabric of the work force is strained to a point of near collapse. We 
have seen traffic increase over the last six to eight months to volumes 
that have exceeded the pre-1981 traffic levels. We have been providing 
this air traffic control with fewer than 50 per cent of the FPL controllers 
that we had prior to the strike. In addition to that, we have been in 
constant training situations.^®®
Throughout 1984, the Subcommittee received a steady record of testimony 
from controllers, facility managers and, organizations such as ALPA and ASI to the 
effect that, within the ATC system, the volume of traffic handled had increased 
faster than had staffing to control the traffic. Many FPL controllers still worked 
six-day weeks, or six-day weeks alternated with five day weeks. As the summer 
approached, facilities reported that, for the third consecutive summer, vacation 
time would only be granted with increased overtime, or that the amount of 
vacation time granted each controller would have to be limited. In June, a 
controller, a supervisor, and a facility manager representing Atlanta, Cleveland and 
Salt Lake City respectively, testified that supervisors in their facilities still worked
®®Federai Aviation Adminstration, "M an agem ent and Employee Relationships," p. 68. 
^®®Committee on Public Works and Transportation, S tatus, p. 238.
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traffic on a regular basis which meant that the facilities provided no backup to 
working controllers. The individuals who testified believed that supervisors still 
routinely controlled traffic throughout the system. Controllers from the Atlanta 
ARTCC testified that, in their center, supervisors routinely denied controllers sick 
leave. As morale dropped, controllers began advocating joining a union. One 
controller testified that "morale at the Washington Center started going downhill in 
the summer of 1983 and it has been going downhill ever since, and controllers are 
beginning to feel the only way that they will have a voice that can really be heard 
by the FAA is if they organize formally and officially.
The FAA did not deny that morale problems existed. During the fall of 1983 
and into the summer of 1984, its administration changed hands. J. Lynn Flelms left 
the post of administrator, and Michael Fenello temporarily replaced him. Donald 
Engen, in turn, permanently replaced Mr. Fenello. Each testified that they had 
implemented recommendations made in the Jones Report aimed at improving 
morale, but that the effort would take several years before positive results could 
be expected.
In response to questions about overtime, Michael Fenello testified that it 
still occurred in 1984, but "that every effort is made to excuse a controller who 
does not wish to work the overtime . . . [although] this is not possible in every 
case."^^^ In recognizing that a problem might exist, Fenello made a major step 
forward. In 1983, J. Lynn Helms had testified that controllers no longer had to 
work overtime. Helms stated that, on average, controllers worked 40.9 hours per 
week. Later, the Subcommittee determined that the FAA had arrived at this 
average only by including new controllers in training at the FAA Academy as well 
as personnel assigned to administrative duties.
p. 1373.
l°2 |b id . .  p. 1041.
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Stress among air traffic controllers continued to be a concern. The 
Subcommittee devoted three days to hearing testimony on how to identify and 
relieve stress among controllers. Dr. Robert Rose, who had headed up a major 
pre-strike study on controller stress, testified before the Subcommittee. He again 
emphasized that the one finding that had surprised him and his co-workers the 
most had been the extent to which low morale and alienation contributed to the 
amount of stress controllers experienced on the job.^°^ Dr. Rose added that, for 
the most part, the FAA had not acted upon the recommendations included in the 
report for dealing with stress. In fact, FAA officials had told him that he had 
overstepped his bounds, that his contract required him "to study stress and not 
attitude." The FAA technical assistant at the time Dr. Rose submitted the report. 
Dr. Stanley Mohler, agreed with Dr. Rose that, while the report received a great 
deal of attention from many offices within the FAA, overall, the FAA had given it a 
poor reception. He testified that in the medical offices where he had worked many 
individuals "denied that there was such a phenomenon as stress. . . . Our medical 
scientists in Oklahoma City were ordered to delete the word from their 
manuscripts for a period.
Given the testimony before the Subcommittee throughout 1983 and 1984, it 
is reasonable to conclude that, at least since the immediate post-strike period, job 
satisfaction among air traffic controllers had declined, overtime remained a 
problem for controllers in major facilities, and controllers still experienced stress 
on the job due both to the type of work involved and the environment in which it 
took place. The only reasonable way to compare levels of job satisfaction and 
stress to the pre-strike period would be to repeat the Survey o f Organizations, 
with the supplemental questions devised In the Jones Report, among a cross-
^°^lbid.. p. 862.
104 ,bid., pp. 8 8 2 -8 8 3 .
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section of working controllers. Although Jones et al. administered the 
questionnaire after the strike, it is the best indicator of pre-strike conditions 
because it included striking controllers. The original survey sampled fifty-seven  
per cent of the controllers, selected randomly, along with paired samples of 
striking controllers. Working controllers received the questionnaire through the 
mall, while interviewers surveyed striking controllers in group sessions. Fifty-five  
per cent of striking controllers responded, and forty-five per cent of working 
controllers r e s p o n d e d . T o  repeat the survey In 1985 would involve selecting the 
same proportion of working controllers, i.e., fifty-seven per cent, at random and 
reissuing the survey through the mall.
Comparisons of pre-strike and post-strike overtime worked by air traffic 
controllers could be done by comparing both scheduled work weeks at facilities for 
Individuals performing air traffic control duties and overtime hours for selected pay 
periods. The former would be necessary since, in the post-strike period, many 
controllers had regularly scheduled work weeks that exceeded forty hours. The 
testimony of FAA officials before Congress Indicates that overtime hours for 
selected pay periods Is compiled for FAA use. It would be appropriate to compare 
overtime hours by selecting weeks representing different seasons of the year, 
since for many facilities summer is a peak season for overtime, while at other 
facilities, such as the Miami terminal, winter may be the peak season. Therefore, 
records would have to be selected for one week of each quarter of the year for 
the years 1978 to 1984, i.e., the third week of February, the third week of May, the 
third week of August, and the third week of November.
Throughout 1983 and 1984, FAA officials admitted before Congress that 
many ATC facilities nationwide still required overtime In order to keep the system 
operating. In September 1983, a report issued by the Human Relations Committee
^®®Federal Aviation Adm inistration, "M anagem ent and Employee Relationships," p. 15.
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Task Group at the Leesburg, VA ARTCC (a committee set up by the FAA in
response to recommendations in the Jones Report) stated:
There is confusion about whether or not controllers can refuse 
overtime if ordered to work. There is no written policy regarding 
overtime and the requirement to work it or not. The word 'forced 
overtime' has been used. A better word to use would be intimidation.
Any review of overtime hours worked would, without question, indicate that, in 
some, if not all, major facilities, the amount of overtime worked by experienced 
controllers had increased significantly in comparison with the pre-strike period. 
Overtime, up to eight hours a week per controller, continued to be a requirement 
in the fall of 1984.^®^
That fall, Lawrence Jones revisited several ATC facilities at the request of 
Donald Engen, Administrator of the FAA, to determine whether or not the FAA had
carried out the recommendations made in the Jones Report. Furthermore, the FAA
asked Mr. Jones to determine if any changes they had made had had a beneficial 
impact on employee morale. Mr. Jones concluded, in a December 1984 report, that 
many employees viewed the Human Relations Committees and the Facility 
Advisory Boards set up by the FAA to improve communication and em ployee- 
m anagement relations, as "inconsequential windowdressing." Furthermore, the 
report stated that the increase in traffic volume exceeded "the capacity of the 
human-technical system." In speaking of employee morale, the report stated that 
"conditions are as bad as in 1981, or perhaps a bit worse."^°® Mr, Jones's 
statements give strong support to the expectation that job satisfaction and stress 
among controllers has not improved in comparison to pre-strike conditions.
 ̂*^®Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Status, p. 385.
^^^Donald Engen, FAA Administrator, told the N e w  York Times {December 16, 1984) that the FAA 
w ould  end requirem ents  for abnorm al overtim e by June 1985.
^*^®Quoted in Joan Walsh, "Air Controllers Unite," In These Times 9 (9 -1 5  January 1985) : 2.
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Are the Skies Safe? The Volum e and Safety of Air Traffic, 1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 5
In April 1982, the FAA began a steady increase in IFR traffic accepted into 
NAS. By May 1983, they announced that they had achieved their goal, on schedule, 
of having the capabiity, within the system, to handle 100 per cent of pre-strike 
traffic with flow control in place. By December 1983, the FAA had lifted flow  
control restrictions at all but the four largest airports, and the FAA lifted these 
restrictions during 1984. Table IV-1 on page 57 gives traffic data for fiscal years 
1978-1983. The total volume of traffic handled in 1983 remained lower than pre­
strike levels, which the FAA attributed to a weak economy rather than the 
capabilities of NAS. However, the turn around for NAS certainly occurred in 1983 
when, for the first time since the strike, the volume of IFR traffic handled increased 
in all categories. Air taxi traffic surged to a new high with more than half a billion 
IFR flights. Air carrier and military traffic recovered from their 1982 low so that 
the amount of traffic in these categories in 1983 almost equaled 1981 levels. 
General aviation, hardest hit by the strike, also showed a small increase in 1983.
During the post-strike period, air traffic not only increased, but its 
distribution nationwide shifted. This shift occurred as airlines adjusted to 
deregulation, which spurred the rapid growth of air taxi service and encouraged 
many airlines to practice a hub and spoke' method of scheduling. Under this type 
of scheduling, air carriers arrived at and departed from their base airport within a 
brief morning and afternoon period so that travellers could make connections 
quickly and conveniently on the same airline. This resulted in intense traffic peaks 
at key airports and ARTCCs throughout the nation. As early as September 1982, 
the NTSB found three terminals and two ARTCCs in a study of twenty-five
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Table IV -1 ; IFR AIR TRAFFIC ACTIVITY FOR FISCAL YEARS 1978-1983
TOTAL
AIR
CARRIER
AIR
TAXI
GENERAL
AVIATION MILITARY
1978
T o ta l 33,456,726 10,421,496 3,066,809 16,310,259 3,658,162
Change + 6 % + 4 % +20 7o +8 % -  2 %
1979
T o ta l 36,225,027 10,737,637 3,657,696 17,907,628 3,922,066
Change + 8 % + 3 % + 19 7o + 10 7o + 7 %
1980
T o ta l 38,176,549 10,613,262 4,128,782 19,332,557 4,101,948
Change + 5 % -  1 7o + 13 7o + 8 % + 5 %
1981
T o ta l 37,221,490 10,164,678 4,635,285 18,530,746 3,890,781
Change -  3 % -  4 7o + 12 % -  4 % -  5 %
1982
T o ta l 31,662,987 9,520,107 4,633,905 13,907,533 3,601,442
Change -1 5  % -  6 7o a -2 5  7o -  7 7o
1983P
T o ta l 34,039,181 10,126,868 5,346,419 14,755,146 3,810,748
Change + 8 % + 6 % + 15 % + 6 7o + 6 7o
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Information Analysis Branch,FAA S ta tis tic a l Handbook o f A viation, Washington, D C. 
1981, p. 12; 1983, p. 14.
®Less than 0.5 % change.
Ppreiiminary data.
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terminals and sixteen ARTCCs, which, when compared on a month to month basis, 
handled traffic at greater than 100 per cent of pre-strike levels/*®®
The total number of aircraft accidents and fatalities fell during the post­
strike period for all aircraft types except airlines. Airline accidents and fatalities 
stayed approximately the same in comparison to pre-strike levels. Tables IV-2, 
IV-3, and IV -4  give the total number of accidents for each aircraft category, the 
total number of fatal accidents, and the total number of fatalities for the years 
1978 to 1983. Data are not available for 1984. The rate of accidents per 100,000 
hours flight time, however, remains approximately the same for each flight 
category, except commuter flights which show a significant drop in accident rates 
in the post-strike period. Table IV-5 on page 62 provides these data for the years 
1978 to 1983. These accident statistics include all airline accidents which occurred 
during these years, except for sabotage and/or suicide accidents. In both their 
1982 and 1983 Annual Reports, the National Transportation Safety Board found no 
reason to cite the ATC system for causing more accidents during the post-strike 
period as compared to the pre-strike period.*
The Board, however, did express concern that staffing levels lagged behind 
increases in traffic volume.*** Not only did the FAA have fewer people controlling 
traffic, but the ratio of FPL controllers to developmental controllers remained low. 
In March 1983, J. Lynn Helms testified that the FAA employed 13,388 controllers.
*®®U.S., National Transportation  Safety Board, "Special Investigation: Foltowup Study of the Air 
Traff ic  Control System," in Status of the ^  Traff ic Control System. Hearings before the subcom m ittee  
on investigations and Oversight of C om m ittee  on Public Works and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st
and 2nd sess., 1983 -1984 , pp. 5 0 -5 2 .
**®U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual Report W  Congress, Washington, D C , 1983, p 
14.
* * * l b i d .
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Table IV -2 : AVIATION ACCIDENTS FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1978 -  1983
YEAR AIRLINES COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATION
1978 21 61 198 4,218
1979 24 52 160 3,825
1980 15 38 170 3,597
1981 25 31 157 3,502
1982 16 27 133 3,216
1983P 20 17 141 3,091
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual R eport tc
Congress, Washington, D C., 1978-1983. 
'^Preliminary data.
with 1,000 more in the academy.’ ^̂  In February 1984, Michael Fenello testified that 
the FAA had 13,274 employees working air traffic, of whom 4,388 worked as 
develop mentals or assistants who could not actually control traffic.^ During 
1983, therefore, the FAA apparently made no progress toward achieving their goal 
of having 14,300 FPL controllers staffing ATC facilities. Facility managers at 
seventeen facilities, out of thirty-six surveyed in the fall of 1982, believed that they 
would not have full staffing until the summer of 1984, or even 1985, although the 
FAA expected their facilities to handle traffic at 100 per cent of pre-strike levels by 
the summer of 1983 at the latest. Other managers expected full staffing by 1983,
^^^C om m ittee  on Public Works and Transportation, S tatus, p. 14. 
” 3|bid., p. 1040.
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Table IV -3 : FATAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1978 -  1983
YEAR AIRLINES COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATION
1978 5 14 54 721
1979 4 15 30 638
1980 0 8 45 622
1981 4 9 40 654
1982 5 5 30 578
1983P 4 2 28 548
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual Report to 
Congress, Washington, D C., 1978-1983.
^Preliminary data.
but had already been notified that the FAA considered their facilities capable of 
handling full traffic l e v e l s . I n  March 1984, six ARTCC managers testified before 
Congress, representing Indianapolis, Chicago, Atlanta, New York, Cleveland, and Los 
Angeles. Each testified that the FAA had authorized fewer controllers for his 
center than had been authorized prior to the strike, but that the authorized staffing 
level for his center would be sufficient to handle operations. However, each 
manager also testified that he had fewer controllers working for him than the FAA 
had authorized for his center. All the managers testified that they particularly 
needed FPL controllers.^
^^^National Transportation S afety  Board, "Special Investigation; Followup," pp. 55 -56 .  
^^®Comm ittee on Public Works and Transportation, Safety, pp. 4 8 6 -4 9 6 .
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Tab le  IV -4 : FATALITIES IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS FOR CAL YEARS 1978 -  1983
YEAR AIRLINES COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATIONS
1978 160 48 155 1,558
1979 351 66 77 1,237
1980 0 37 103 1,252
1981 4 34 94 1,282
1982 235 14 70 1,161
1983P 15 11 60 1,049
SOURCE: U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual R eport tc
Congress, Washington, D C., 1978-1983.
^Includes air carrier fatalities when in collision with general aviation aircraft. 
PPreliminary data.
In the fall of 1982, the National Transportation Safety Board did a follow-up  
study on safety in the ATC system. Their conclusions included the following;
1. There has not been an increase in ATC-involved accidents since the 
controllers' strike, nor have there been any accidents attributed to 
strike-related causes.
2. Operational errors and operational deviations are occurring, but are not 
being reported or investigated in a standardized manner, as prescribed 
by FAA directives.
3. Pilot deviations are occurring, but are not being reported or 
investigated adequately in many cases, as prescribed by FAA directives.
4. The FAA does not have an adequate measure of system safety
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Table IV -5: ACCIDENT RATES FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1978-1983  
Rates are for number of accidents per 100,000 hours flight time.
AIRLINES® COMMUTERS TAXIS
GENERAL
AVIATION®
1978
T o ta l 0.348 4.68 5.58 12.10
F a ta l 0.083 1.08 1.52 2.06
1979
T o ta l 0.358 4.44 4.34 9.90
F a ta l 0.060 1.28 0.81 1.65
1980
T o ta l 0.221 3.23 4.70 9.90
F a ta l 0.000 0.68 1.24 1.71
1981
To ta l 0.380 2.50 5.42 9.50
F a ta l 0.061 0.73 1.38 1.78
1982
To ta l 0.234 2.08 4.08 10.00
F a ta l 0.062 0.38 0.92 1.79
1983P
T o ta l 0.306 1.23 4.55 9.40
F a ta l 0.061 0.15 0.90 1.67
SOURCE; U.S., National Transportation Safety Board, Annual Report tc
Congress. Washington, D C., 1978-1983.
BRates do not include sabotage/suicide accidents. 
PPreliminary data.
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indicators in place for use as 'performance standards' for controllers 
and to assess quality or safety of the ATC system, nor has the FAA 
developed a standard reporting base.^^®
System safety indicators include system errors and near misses. The Board 
reported that, given FAA data on system errors, near misses, and traffic volume, 
incidents had decreased significantly. For example, in comparing the twelve  
months prior to the strike with the twelve months after the strike, system errors 
decreased 34.9 per cent at en route centers and 44.5 per cent at terminals.^
The Board based its determination, that system safety indicator statistics
could not be relied upon, on anecdotal information as well as computer records of
conflict alerts. The computer data, which the Board had randomly selected, 
revealed "several cases of unreported operational errors or pilot deviations" from 
FAA separation s t a n d a r d s . ^ A s  an alternative to FAA data, the Board had relied 
on NASA data for its previous study. In 1982, the Board reported that many 
facilities did not make the NASA forms "readily available" to controllers, while at 
other facilities controllers either did not know that the purely voluntary program 
existed or did not bother to fill out the reports.^
In January 1985, the Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP) came out
with a study which compared pilot reports of near misses submitted to three of 
the FAA's nine regional offices with near miss data put out by the FAA in 
Washington, D C. The ACAP study found sixty-three reports filed in 1983 and 1984
^^^National Transportation Safety Board, "Special Investigation; Followup," p. 120. 
 ̂  ̂^Ibid., p. 14.
^''®lbid., p. 16.
^^^Ibid., p. 21.
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at the regional level which had not been included in national summaries of near 
misses collected by the FAA. Furthermore, when ABC news contacted the FAA, a 
spokesperson admitted that an additional thirty-nine incidents reported as 
operational errors had, in fact, been near misses.
Ample evidence exists, therefore, that any study of published FAA statistics
on near misses and operational errors would not be accurate. Donald Engen 
testified before Congress, shortly before ACAP released its study, that "near mid­
air collisions have decreased by 50 per cent over the last four-and -a -ha lf  years. 
The total has dropped from 568 in 1980 to 299 in 1984."^^° If all the near misses 
reported by ACAP are accurate, the total for 1984 would increase. In addition, six 
other regional offices may also have records of near misses which the FAA 
Washington office did not report. Also, since the ACAP researchers only looked at 
written logs, there may still be a problem with non-reporting of incidents which 
can only be determined by a detailed review of computer tapes.
NASA data are also unreliable because reporting is voluntary, and because
the FAA has not made certain that controllers are both aware of the program and
participating in it. During the pre-strike period, PATCO controllers, anxious to 
prove the ATC system unsafe, had an incentive to report incidents. No such 
incentive exists among working controllers today, and, at least for the first months 
after the strike, controllers may not have wanted to report incidents which would 
make the system look bad. A voluntary program for reporting incidents, run by an 
outside agency, will not work unless the FAA actively endorses and promotes the 
program or allows the outside agency into the workplace on a regular basis to 
promote the program and make certain controllers are participating in it.
IZOpgipi^ Nader and Christopher J. Witkowski, le tter to Elizabeth Hanford Dole, Secretary of 
Transportation, 11 January 1985, pp. 1 -2 .  (Photocopied.)
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The question of safety of the ATC system during the post-strike period 
remains unanswerable. The fact that it is unanswerable leads to the obvious 
question; if the FAA's primary goal is to provide the safest ATC system possible, 
why are they not generating the necessary data which would enable them to 
assess the safety of the system and to assess what steps must be taken to 
increase safety? There are two reasonable explanations as to why accurate 
system safety indicators are unavailable. One is that the FAA is performing its job 
incompetently. In this case, the problem is that, although the data exist on 
computer, the FAA is not collecting them in an adequate manner. The second 
explanation is that the FAA is more concerned about appearing safe than achieving 
safety. Controllers testifying before Congress in 1983 and 1984 called the conflict 
alert system squeal-a-deal' and indicated that reporting incidents, even when they 
took the necessary steps to resolve conflicts before they became serious, could 
lead to disciplinary action.
Donald Engen testified in June 1984 that only "four controllers have 
received written warnings in the major category of these e r r o r s . W h e t h e r  or 
not Mr. Engen is accurate, if controllers believe they will be disciplined for self-  
reporting incidents, and if they know that the computer record will probably not be 
checked, then they have no incentive to report incidents for which they may be 
responsible. At some level between Mr. Engen and the working controllers, the 
appearance of safety seems to have more credence than actual safety. Until this 
problem can be resolved, the FAA will not be able to achieve the safest ATC 
system possible.
^^^C om m ittee  on Public Works and Transportation, S tatus, p. 1401.
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION
Although the data needed to make a final conclusion are not available, there 
is certainly strong evidence to support the conclusion that technology has not 
replaced the fired air traffic controllers. First, the FAA has made no new 
technology available to working controllers since the 1981 strike. Second, since 
the strike, the FAA has placed excessive demands on working controllers in order 
to keep the system going. Working controllers have had to put in long overtime 
hours in busy facilities; they have had to help train and work side by side with 
large numbers of developmental controllers who may or may not have the skills 
necessary to handle incidents that occur; and they have had to work in an 
environment which has changed little since prior to the strike, in spite of the fact 
that nearly 12,000 employees risked losing their jobs in an attempt to bring about 
change. Third, although the aviation accident rate has not risen since the strike, 
evidence exists which indicates that the FAA has not make a system-wide attempt 
to collect the data necessary to determine system safety. If developing a safe ATC 
system is truly an FAA priority, the inability or refusal to collect these data 
adequately is inexcusable. For it is these data that would best indicate when and 
where incidents occur and how they might be corrected before tragedy occurs.
Technology as Strikebreaker
The FAA broke the air traffic controllers' strike, and eventually PATCO itself, 
by developing and implementing a contingency plan which relied on a 
computerized flow control system to regulate air traffic across the nation. Without 
this plan, the FAA could not have maintained adequate levels of air traffic in the 
face of such a massive walkout and would, no doubt, have succumbed to political
66
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pressure to negotiate with PATCO. Robert Poli, the president of PATCO at the time 
of the strike, certainly believed that "no American government would take a chance 
of provoking a strike costing $250 million per day in lost business and, inevitably, 
one which risked so many lives.
Computers can be used to break strikes successfully when they "provide 
continued operations with a reduced or fill-in work force —  often composed of 
people with fewer skills' —  and when they enable management "to transfer work 
out of a location that is on strike. In the case of the PATCO strike, the FAA did 
both. They used management and other staff to fill in for striking controllers in 
the short-run, and developmental controllers to fill in for striking controllers in the 
long run. They also transfered work in some locations by shifting airspace 
between neighboring ARTCCs. In this way, ARTCCs heavily impacted by the strike 
reduced their workload while ARTCCs lightly impacted by the strike increased 
theirs.
Unlike many other industries which take advantage of computer technology 
to alleviate the impact of a strike, the ATC system has a responsiblity to provide 
service in an environment that is highly dangerous. Both PATCO and the FAA tried 
to use the safety Issue to strengthen their case in the public eye. PATCO officials 
convinced themselves that the FAA could not operate safely without their 
members, and therefore would not take a strike. Furthermore, they contended that 
the stress caused by working air traffic control, where a mistake could result in 
hundreds of deaths, justified their demands for higher pay. However, higher pay 
for air traffic controllers does not increase safety. When the controllers struck, the 
FAA called PATCO's bluff, took the strike, and successfully turned the safety
^^^Quoted in David Morgan, "Terminal Flight: The Air Traff ic Controllers' Strike of 1981," Journal of 
A m erican  Studies 18 (August 1984) : 167.
Shaiken. "Computers as Strikebreakers," Technology R eview 85 (April 1982) : 51.
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argument against the controllers. How could any group, so concerned about the 
safety of the aviation system, walk off their jobs and endanger the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of people? The FAA became the safety good guys' during 
the immediate post-strike period with Drew Lewis, Secretary of Transportation, 
appearing daily "on all three networks stressing safety first'.'^^'* Although the FAA 
won the public's support as the side most concerned about safety, in reality they 
did no more to address the real issues of safety in the ATC system than had 
PATCO.
For both sides, the emotional issue of who cares more about safety' 
outstripped the real issues of safety. The FAA cannot be expected to create a 
completely accident-free ATC system given that the American people want readily 
accessible air space to all who want to enter it a minimum cost for users. Neither 
can they be expected to eliminate system errors and near misses altogether. 
While such incidents are indicators of possible safety problems, they are also, 
frequently, indicators that the ATC system is working because recovery occurred 
before an accident happened.
A safe ATC system is one in which everything is done, within reason, to 
maximize safety. It is not a system in which a higher priority is put on the 
appearance of safety than on exposing problems which must be resolved in order 
to provide safety. Before it can be said that the FAA is working towards achieving 
the safest possible ATC system the following must be done:
*  The FAA must improve incident reporting.
-  The program for reporting system errors and near misses must 
be improved so that all incidents are reported routinely. First- 
line supervisors must be given responsiblity for assuring that 
controllers working under them report all incidents in accord with
Godsen, DOT spokeswoman, quoted in Morgan, Term inal Flight, p. 180.
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FAA standards. The FAA must also review computer tapes 
routinely to determine if incidents are going unreported, or they 
must develop improved software capable of issuing incident 
reports. Again, the goal must be to determine under what 
conditions incidents occur and what can be done to decrease the 
likelihood of similar incidents occurring in the future. In order to 
assure that incidents are reported, incident reports should be 
used as an internal training tool and not as a justification for 
disciplinary action, unless criminal negligence is involved. This 
will encourage accurate reporting by removing the incentive to 
coverup incidents to avoid being disciplined.
- A n  outside agency, such as NASA, must be brought into the FAA 
on a regular basis to review the reporting system. This will 
provide further assurance that incidents are being accurately 
reported, both at the level of working controllers and at each 
higher level in the FAA. The outside agency should have access 
to computer tapes, interviews with controllers, and data collected 
at each level within the FAA. It is more appropriate that an 
outside agency should serve as a check on the reporting system 
than provide a reporting system because an outside agency does 
not have internal accountablity. The FAA, as an organization, can 
be held accountable for its overall program to an outside agency, 
but individual employees of the FAA, reponsible for administering 
the program, can not be responsible to an outside agency.
*  The FAA must improve NAS computer systems.
-  The 9020 computers in en route centers must be replaced with 
IBM 4341 or comparable computers capable of handling the 
demands of current and future aviation traffic.
-  Computer automation improvement (i.e., software) must become 
an FAA priority. Steps must be taken to slow down the loss of 
automation specialists to the private sector. National automation 
standards must be implemented. The FAA must clearly define 
areas of responsibility and see that the offices in charge of each 
such area fulfill their automation responsiblities.
-  A program for reporting computer outages and startovers must 
be initiated by the FAA with the goal of determining how  
frequently they occur and what impact they have on the overall
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ATC system. In order to assure that outages are accurately 
reported, the FAA must not use reports to discipline employees, 
except when criminal negligence is involved. If outage reports 
are used to compile accurate statistics that will help improve the 
system, and not to discipline the individuals who make the 
reports, a strong incentive to coverup outages will be removed.
*  Traffic peaks must be contained so that individual controllers and 
individual facilities are not handling traffic loads beyond their 
capabilities. The FAA must set a standard maximum load per 
controller, and then make certain that this maximum load is not 
surpassed. This may require reinstating some form of flow control or 
having flexible staffing so that sufficient numbers of controllers are 
available to service peak traffic loads.
*  Every effort must be made to develop and implement the threat alert 
and collision avoidance system (TCAS) so that pilots are provided with 
a back-up to ground control in a conflict situation.
*  The FAA must improve weather information dissemination by assuring 
that air traffic controllers have direct access to hazardous weather 
information. This can be done by enabling meteorologists to speak 
directly to controllers and by giving controllers direct access to the 
radar remote weather display system (RRWDS). In turn, controllers 
must receive training to assure that they properly communicate 
weather hazard information to pilots.
*  The money in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund must be spent on 
facilities and equipment and on research and development as intended.
The FAA must convince Congress that the fund is being spent in 
accord with the original legislation. In order for the FAA to complete 
the replacement of the 9020s in en route centers, as well as carry out 
the goals of the National Airspace System Plan, Congress must 
reinstitute the user fees which originally provided for the trust fund.
In order for these recommendations to succeed, the FAA must develop a 
management style that is not authoritarian, which promotes trust, and which 
includes controllers in the problem-solving process. A new management style 
would also lower stress among controllers, if, in fact, the work environment is a 
major contributing factor to air traffic controller stress. On the way to achieving a
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new management style, the FAA must do the following;
*  The FAA must establish a program to train supervisors and controllers 
in methods of recognizing and alleviating stress, whether or not stress 
is caused by the job or outside factors.
*  The FAA must establish a policy on staffing levels for ATC facilities.
This policy must be based on measurable criteria including the amount 
of traffic handled, the amount of airspace for which a facility is 
responsible, and any documented features which require special 
considerations for a given facility, i.e. , mountainous terrain surrounding 
a terminal.
*  The FAA must establish a clear policy on overtime. This policy must 
delineate under what circumstances overtime is mandatory. 
Furthermore, it must set maximum limits on overtime for each 
controller within a given time period, i.e., no more than eight hours 
overtime per week and no more than sixteen hours overtime in every 
tw enty-e ight day period. Even controllers who volunteer for overtime 
should not be allowed to work excessive amounts.
*  The FAA must provide ongoing physical health monitoring for air traffic 
controllers taking into account the findings of previous studies on 
stress, such as the Rose report.
*  The FAA must provide and encourage opportunities for controllers to 
seek counseling from mental health experts.
The FAA used technology successfully to break PATCO, but technology has 
not yet proven to be the sole answer to creating a safe ATC system. The 
limitations on current technology require the FAA to develop a professional cadre 
of air traffic controllers, not to mention technicians, automation specialists, etc., to 
make and communicate decisions which, in the ATC system, are still essentially 
human functions. To do this, the FAA will have to learn to maximize human 
efficiency by, in part, recognizing human fraility. Until this is done, or until it is 
possible to replace human controllers with machines, it is doubtful that the safest 
available ATC system will be in place.
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The Price of Upholding a Principle: The Illegal Strike in the Public 
Sector
Aside from taking advantage of the technology available to them to break 
the strike, the FAA had another powerful weapon on their side —  the illegality of 
strikes in the public sectorj^s This meant that when PATCO struck, the FAA knew 
that they would be able to move quickly to fire all striking air traffic controllers. 
They would never have to negotiate with the strikers again; they would never have 
to integrate them back into the workplace again; and they would never have to 
respond to their demands, whether or not the strikers' demands had legitimacy. In 
order to succeed in breaking the union, the FAA also needed public support for 
their actions. The strike coincided with a rise in conservative political power 
which had reached a new high with the 1980 elections. This increased 
conservatism in public opinion provided a political climate supportive of the 
actions taken by the FAA.
In Drew Lewis's morning television sessions during the strike, he 
emphasized not just safety, but the illegality of the strikers' a c t i o n s . S t r i k i n g  
put the air traffic controllers more firmly on the side of the bad guys' because 
they had broken the law and their oath to the fédérai government. In the short
alternative  consideration, which this paper does not explore, is that the negotiating process 
b e tw een  the FAA and PATCO only secondarily contributed to their losses. The strike occurred only 
tw o  years a fte r  airline deregulation w en t into effect —  a major step in a political m ovem ent to 
rem ove governm ent from the decis ion-m aking process of the private sector. The strike effectively  
elim inated  PATCO, but it m ay just have successfully contributed to the limitation of the FAA's role in 
regulating air tra ff ic  in the long run. During the post-str ike  period, the FAA succeeded in returning to 
full capacity  in tw o  to tw o  and a half years, w ith  greatly increased productivity, and no major changes  
in technology. They did this, however, w ith an accompanying inability to regulate the volume of air 
tra ff ic  and either an inability or a disinclination to assure the safety of air traffic. This means that at 
least som e of the safety costs of air travel (a calculation which can only be determ ined w ith  great 
diff icu lty  and no moral certainty) has been passed back to the flying public. In the end, if there is a 
w in n er  of the PATCO strike, it may be the private airlines w ho have passed the cost of safety on to 
the ir  customers.
126,bid.
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run, this made it easier for the FAA to win the strike. Some air traffic controllers, 
dissatisfied with their work environment, would not go so far as to participate in 
an illegal strike. Other individuals may have applied more willingly for air traffic 
control work because the strike had been illegal. Instead of being a scab by 
working air traffic, these individuals became heroes in 1981, upholding patriotic 
values in a national crisis.
Although the FAA won the strike, they lost just as much as the air traffic 
controllers did in the negotiating process. Successful negotiations occur when 
two or more parties are able to address mutual problems and reach a solution 
which is acceptable to both sides. The goal is not to win everything for fear that 
the alternative is to lose everything. Rather, it is to work together to solve 
problems in a mutually beneficial way.
Both the FAA and PATCO approached negotiations as if the only outcome 
was to win everything or lose everything. Robert Poli believed that the walkout 
would cripple the ATC system and, therefore, the controllers would win big. 
Langhorne Bond, FAA Administrator when the negotiations began, believed that 
PATCO could not be negotiated with because the leadership had become "divorced 
from r e a l i t y . I n s t e a d ,  the controllers active in PATCO needed to be taught a
lesson, even fired, so that the FAA could be the big winner.
With the help of computer technology, the FAA got their big win, but the
problems which the FAA and PATCO should have addressed and resolved in
negotiations never had a chance to be aired. The FAA is left with those problems 
still a part of the ATC system. If their attempts to carry out the recommendations 
of the Jones Report are the windowdressing they're accused of being, this 
indicates that the FAA still has not learned to solve problems mutually with the air 
traffic controllers.
^^^Quoted in Francke, "FAA's Finest Hour," p. 395.
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The result of not learning may well be new militancy among the ranks of 
the air traffic controllers. In that case, the strike, rather than solving any problems, 
may merely have postponed the day when a well-organized union will come along 
and force the FAA into another confrontation with consequences that could be 
even worse for the ATC system. More certainly, the result will be an inability to 
achieve the safest air traffic control system possible because the safest possible 
system is one in which problems are solved cooperatively between those 
responsible for administering the system and those responsible for working air 
traffic control on a daily basis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Congressional Hearings and Reports
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. ^  Traffic Control 
Computer Failures. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. FAA Aviation Safety 
Reporting System. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979,
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Oversight on 
Grievances of Air Traffic Control Specialists. Hearing before the
subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the Committee 
on Post Office and Civil Service. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Public Works and Transportation. Aviation 
Safety: Air Traffic Control (PATCO Walkout). Hearings before the
subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Public 
Works and Transportation. 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1981-1982.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Public Works and Transportation. FAA Facility 
and Equipment Programs for Safety. Hearings before the subcommittee on 
Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 95th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1978.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Public Works and Transportation The Impact 
of Weather on Aviation Safety. Report of the subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation. H. Rept. 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Public Works and Transportation. Safety of
the Air Traffic Control Systems. Hearings before the subcommittee on
Aviation of t_he Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 96th Cong., 
1st sess., 1979.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Public Works and Transportation. Status of
the Air Traffic Control System. Hearings before the subcommittee on
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation. 98th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1983-1984.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Traffic Control
En Route Computer Modernization. Report prepared ^  the subcommittee on 
Transportation, Aviation, and Materials of the Committee on Science and 
Technology. H. Rept. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Aircraft Collision 
Avoidance and Air Traffic Safety. Hearing before the subcommittee on 
Transportation, Aviation, and Materials of the Committee on Science and 
Technology. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Review of Midair Aviation 
Safety. Hearing before the subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on 
Wavs and Means. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation. Aviation Safety. Joint 
Hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate and t he Committee on Public Works 
Transportation. House of Representatives. 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Airport and Air Traffic Control
System. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982.
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Review of the FAA 1982 National 
Airspace System Plan. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982.
G overnm ent Documents
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. "Automating the 
Crowded Sky," by Raymond G. Belanger. Washington, DC. Reprinted by 
permission from Airforce Association July 1975. (Mimeographed.)
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. "Management 
and Employee Relationships Within the Federal Aviation Administration," 
prepared by Lawrence M. Jones, David G. Bowers, and Stephen H. Fuller. In 
Air Traffic Control Revitalization Act of 1981. Hearings before the Committee  
on Post Office and Civil Service. 97th Cong,, 1st and 2nd sess., 1981-1982,
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. Information 
Analysis Branch. FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation. Washington, DC. 
1978-1983.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. Los Angeles 
TRACON. "Report from the National Automation Conference," by Robert 
Kelm. (Mimeographed.)
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. Office of
Aviation Medicine. "Adjustments in the Air Traffic Service Following the 
PATCO Strike," by E.W. Pickrel. In Selection of Traffic Controllers, pp. 
119-126. Edited by S.B. Sells, John T. Daily and Evan W. Pickrel. Washington 
D.C. 1984.
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. Office of
Aviation Medicine. "Air Traffic Controller Health Change Study," by Robert
M. Rose, C. David Jenkins, and Michael W. Hurst. In Aviation Medical 
Reports. AM Series. Washington, D.C. 1978.
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. Office of
Aviation Medicine. Selection of ^  Traffic Controllers, ed. S.B. Sells, John 
T. Daily, and Evan W. Pickrel. Washington, D.C. 1984.
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. Annual Report to Congress. Washington, 
D.C. 1978-1983.
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. "Special Investigation: Followup Study of 
the Air Traffic Control System." In Status of the ,^r Traff ic Control System. 
Hearings before the subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 98th Cong., 1st and 2nd 
sess., 1983-1984.
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. "Special Investigation Report. Air Traffic 
Control System." In Aviation Safety: Air Traffic Control (PATCO Walkout). 
Hearings before the subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd 
sess., 1981-1982.
Journal A rtic les
Bowers, David G. "What Would Make 11,500 People Quit Their Jobs?" Organizational 
Dynamics 11 (Winter 1983) : 5-19.
Finkelman, Jay M. and Kirschner, Carl. "An Information-Processing Interpretation of 
Air Traffic Control Stress." Human Factors 22 (October 1980) : 561-567.
Fowler, Frank D. "Air Traffic Control Problems: A Pilot's View." Human Factors 22 
(October 1980) : 645-653.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
Morgan, David. "Terminal Flight: The Air Traffic Controllers' Strike of 1981." Journal 
of American Studies 18 (August 1984) : 165-183.
Shaiken, Harley. "Computers as Strikebreakers.' Technology Review 85 (April 1982) : 
50-51.
Toong, Hoo-m in D. and Gupta, Amar. "Automating Air Traffic Control." Technology 
Review 85 (April 1982) : 40-54.
O th er
Francke, Don. "The FAA's Finest Hour . . .  An Interview with Langhorne M. Bond, 
former FAA Administrator." Journal of Traffic Control January-March  
1982. Reprinted in U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service. ^  Traffic Control Revitalization Act of 1981. Hearings before the 
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 
1981-1982.
Gaiipault, John. Aviation Safety Institute, Worthington, Ohio. Interview, 15 February 
1985.
Nader, Ralph and Witkowski, Christopher J. Letter to Elizabeth Hanford Dole, 
Secretary of Transportation, 11 January 1985. (Photocopied.)
Walsh, Joan. "Air Controllers Unite." In These Times 9 (9-15 January 1985) : 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
